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Articles
Contractual Incapacity and the
Americans with Disabilities Act
Sean M. Scott*
ABSTRACT
The doctrine of contractual incapacity allows people with
mental disabilities to avoid their contractual liability.  Its underly-
ing premise is that the law has an obligation to protect people
with such disabilities both from themselves and from unscrupu-
lous people who would take advantage of them; mental incapac-
ity provides this protection by rendering certain contracts
unenforceable.  The Disability Rights Movement (“DRM”),
however, has challenged such protective legal doctrines, as they
rest on outmoded concepts about people with mental disabilities.
This essay argues that the mental incapacity doctrine under-
mines the goals of the DRM and the legislative goals of the
Americans with Disabilities Act.  First, the doctrine reinforces
stereotypes about people with mental disabilities, contributing to
the negative social construction of disability.  Second, it contrib-
utes to the social exclusion of people with mental disabilities, as
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  My thanks to Susan Bahk-
shian, Alexander Boni-Saenz, Allison Carey, Victor Gold, Danielle Hart, Eve Hill,
and Justin Levitt for their insightful suggestions and comments.  Additional thanks
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the threat of contract rescission discourages commerce with peo-
ple with mental disabilities.  Third, the doctrine unjustifiably im-
poses a requirement of rationality upon transactions entered into
by people with mental disabilities.  Finally, the doctrine demeans
people with disabilities by shielding them from the risk-taking
that is an integral part of life.
To mitigate the harm caused by contractual incapacity I pro-
pose that the doctrine be restricted to people who were subject to
a plenary guardianship when they entered into the contract.
Such a restriction is an imperfect proposal, but it strikes a better
balance between the rights of people with mental disabilities and
the mental incapacity doctrine than currently exists.
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INTRODUCTION
There has been some form of contractual mental incapacity
doctrine since Justinian ruled the Roman Empire.1  Its contours
have changed over time, but at its core is the principle that the law
should protect those with mental disabilities from their own poor
judgment and the unscrupulousness of others.  By contrast, the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)2 is relatively new— Con-
gress enacted the ADA in 1990.  The ADA rejects the idea that
people with mental disabilities need protection, challenges the
subordinate status of people with disabilities, and advocates for the
nondiscriminatory treatment of those with disabilities.  This essay
explores these two doctrines, their relationship, and the underlying
values they each represent.
Exploration of the mental incapacity doctrine, the ADA, and
the Disability Rights Movement (“DRM”) has led me to argue the
following:  the mental incapacity doctrine, as currently constituted,
is outmoded and should be limited to people with mental disabili-
ties who were subject to a plenary guardianship when they entered
into the contract at issue.  I offer two primary arguments to justify
this limitation.  First, the mental incapacity doctrine is inconsistent
with the underlying policies and goals of the ADA and the DRM.
The doctrine socially constructs disability identity by relying on and
reifying disability stereotypes.  It also disincentives providers of
goods and services from entering into contracts with people with
disabilities, undermining their ability to fully participate in and inte-
grate into society.  Second, it improperly invokes rationality as a
basis for policing the agreements entered into by people with
mental disabilities, an approach challenged by behavioral econom-
ics and the dignity of risk doctrine.
This essay will use the following hypothetical, which is largely
based on an actual case, to explore my proposal of limiting the
mental incapacity doctrine’s applicability.  In 2009, Randolph
Renchard entered into a contract to purchase a luxury yacht.3  To
make the purchase, he liquidated his trust fund and traded in his
1. SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 9 (3d
ed. 1985); W.G.H. Cook, Mental Deficiency and the English Law of Contract, 21
COLUM. L. REV. 424, 426 (1921).  Gaw argues that there is evidence that there was
Roman Law on the subject even prior to Justinian’s rule. ALBERT C. GAW, THE
LEGAL STATUS OF THE DEAF: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSI-
BILITIES OF DEAF-MUTES IN THE LAWS OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, FRANCE, EN-
GLAND, AND AMERICA 10 (1907).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
3. Renchard v. Prince William Marine Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 271, 274
(D.D.C. 2015).
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previous boat for a down payment.  Mr. Renchard then financed
the yacht through the Prince William Marine Sales, Inc.  After
purchasing the yacht for $1.4 million, Mr. Renchard began incurring
charges for maintenance and upgrades that ultimately accrued to
approximately $73,000.  Prince William alleged Mr. Renchard failed
to pay for these charges and failed to honor subsequent agreements
concerning these arrearages, asserting this was the basis for repos-
session and sale of the yacht to an unrelated third party.4
Mr. Renchard sued Prince William on several counts, including
wrongful repossession and unjust enrichment.  He argued, inter alia,
that he did not have the mental capacity to enter into any of the
contracts with the defendant.  In his original complaint, Mr.
Renchard described himself as being “profoundly and pre-linguisti-
cally deaf and [as] us[ing] American Sign Language for daily com-
munication.”5  Mr. Renchard also alleged he had learning
disabilities.6  Prince William filed a motion to dismiss, based, in
part, on the argument Mr. Renchard fully understood the transac-
tions entered into regarding the yacht.  The court partially denied
the defendant’s motion to dismiss, arguing
[t]here is a material factual dispute as to whether the plaintiff
could enter into a valid contract by reason of his mental and
physical disabilities, and, consequently, whether the note regard-
ing his Account and later Bill of Sale are sufficient to prove that
the plaintiff was able to understand the consequences of his
actions.7
The court’s finding echoed the classic test used to measure
mental incapacity:  does the person seeking to avoid the contract
had the cognitive ability to understand the nature of the transac-
tion?8  If Mr. Renchard established his mental incapacity, then the
court would have avoided his contract based on the mental incapac-
ity doctrine.
Mr. Renchard attempted to amend his original complaint by
adding a cause of action for discrimination under Title III of the
ADA.  Title III prohibits certain private actors from discriminating
based on disability.  Because defendant Prince William Marine
Sales, Inc. agreed to sell the yacht to plaintiff Mr. Renchard and to
finance it, and because injunction is the only remedy provided for
4. Id. at 275–76.
5. Renchard v. Prince William Marine Sales, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C.
2014).
6. Id. at 3.
7. Renchard, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 281.
8. This test will be developed more fully in Section IV, infra.
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the violation of Title III,9 Mr. Renchard was unable to add this
cause of action to his complaint.
While a collision between the mental incapacity doctrine and
the ADA was avoided in Renchard, a slight variation could bring
these two doctrines into direct conflict.  Assume that after the
court’s holding, the seller/lender defendant, apprehensive of an-
other potential lawsuit, imposed additional screening requirements
on people whom it perceived to have a mental disability.  This
seller/lender might use this strategy to manage anxiety about the
heightened risk of default or contract avoidance and rescission
based on mental incapacity.  These additional requirements would
arguably violate Title III of the ADA and give potential purchasers
a cause of action for discrimination under the Act—this is espe-
cially true if a seller/lender refused to contract with someone be-
cause of their mental disability.  This hypothetical provides an
opportunity to review the mental incapacity doctrine and its value
in light of the DRM and the ADA.  The language of both the DRM
and the ADA directly conflict with the mental incapacity doctrine,
as do the principles these doctrines represent.  Thus, I conclude that
the mental incapacity doctrine should yield to the DRM and the
ADA.10
Following this Introduction, Part II provides a historical over-
view of the mental incapacity doctrine and the standards used to
measure incapacity.  Part III provides an overview of the ADA pro-
visions that govern private entities acting in a public capacity.  Part
IV considers arguments that support revising the doctrine in ways
that take into account the values of the DRM and the ADA.  Part
V briefly considers contract doctrines that may provide a reasona-
ble alternative to the mental incapacity doctrine.  Part VI ends with
a coda about the evolving relationship between mental incapacity,
the DRM, and the ADA.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF MENTAL INCAPACITY IN CONTRACT LAW
A. Historical Overview
The freedom to contract is a concept fundamental to contract
law and allows parties to enter freely into any bargains they choose
with little interference from courts.  Traditionally, the courts medi-
9. Renchard, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 279.  For the ADA section specifying injunctive
relief as the sole remedy for violation of Title III, see 42 U.S.C. § 12188.
10. For an insightful, complementary article that explores the reconceptual-
ization of the mental incapacity doctrine in the context of sexuality see generally
Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexuality and Incapacity, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201 (2015).
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ate contractual disputes to uphold procedural integrity—that is,
courts ensure transactions conform to the legal requirements of for-
mation, performance, breach, and remedies.11  Under classical con-
tract theory, courts are constrained in policing the substance of the
exchange.12  There have always been exceptions to this general rule,
however.13  Pursuant to the mental incapacity exception, courts
may delve beneath the mechanics of contract formation.  When a
person with questionable capacity enters into a transaction, the
court may review the substance of that transaction to ensure the
other contracting party has not taken advantage of her.
The history of the mental incapacity doctrine reveals judicial
and societal ambivalence not only about the doctrine but about
mental illness and disability more generally.14  This ambivalence
has many sources.  Historically, skepticism may have been based on
a society-wide lack of scientific knowledge about mental illness and
disability.15  Individuals exhibiting signs of mental illness or disabil-
ity are often pitied, feared, or condemned as evil by society.  This
lack of understanding has created disbelief about the existence of
mental disabilities.  Such disbelief perpetuates the idea that an indi-
vidual may fake symptoms of illness to avoid legal liability.16  Al-
though scientific findings have deepened the societal, and thus
11. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, UNITED STATES CONTRACT LAW 70–71, 91
(1991); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 15 (1974).
12. GILMORE, supra note 11, at 15.
13. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 19–20 (1965); see
also FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 98; Melvin Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle
and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 742 (1982).
14. This societal and legal discomfort is not one that Americans have out-
grown.  “The entire legal system makes assumptions about persons with mental
disabilities . . . [t]hese assumptions reflect our fears and apprehensions about
mental disability, persons with mental disability and the possibility that we may
become mentally disabled.”  Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped
Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed
as it Did, 10 J. CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES 3, 17 (1999).
15. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 16.  Brakel notes:
[T]he development of the law as it affects the rights of the mentally dis-
abled has been dependent on many factors [including] . . . the state of the
medical knowledge of the cause, care, and proper treatment of the men-
tally disabled . . . and the legal profession’s awareness of the social reali-
ties of mental disability. . . .
Id.  Justice Kennedy commented on societal ambivalence in his concurrence in
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 608 (1999) (Kennedy, J., Concurring).
16. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 18.  Skepticism about the existence of
disability, whether mental or physical, continues to be a public policy norm; see
Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 809, 830 (1966) (“[T]he disabled client finds himself confronted
with a presumption not of innocence and eligibility [for public benefits] but of guilt
and probable fraud.”).
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legal, understanding of mental disabilities,17 the difficulty in defin-
ing mental illness and mental disability continues, raising ongoing
questions about the role of the law and civil and criminal accounta-
bility for those with mental illnesses and disabilities.18
Despite skepticism, the legal field did acknowledge it ought to
consider the enforceability of contracts entered into by people with
mental disabilities. The Mentally Disabled and the Law briefly
traces the history of Western laws governing mental disability.  Ex-
planations for what causes mental disabilities have shifted non-
linearly, from religious causes, to medical or social causes (or a
combination of both).  In ancient times, and again during the Mid-
dle Ages, people with mental disabilities were thought to be pos-
sessed by demons and were treated accordingly.19 Rejecting the
idea of demon possession, both Greek and Roman societies devel-
oped medical explanations and instituted corresponding changes in
the treatment of mental disabilities.20
Regardless of the disability’s cause, societies grapple with the
legal status of individuals with disabilities.  The concept of contrac-
tual incapacity arose under Roman Law.  Initially, the law focused
on preventing certain people from entering into valid contracts.
According to Roman Law, a contract entered into by a person with
a mental disability was void, as this person was unable to consent to
the agreement due to the disability.21  The Visigothic Code contin-
ued this prohibition but recognized that a person with a mental dis-
ability could have periods of lucidity and that contracts made
during such periods were valid.22  As Western society’s understand-
ing of mental disabilities increased, courts created more categories
of the legally disabled, and the rights and responsibilities of individ-
uals belonging to those categories became more nuanced.23  Re-
gardless, English and American courts were still concerned about
17. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 15–16; Robert M. Brucken et al.,
Mental Illness and the Law of Contracts, 57 MICH. L. REV. 1020, 1033 (1959).
18. See NAT’L. COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP: TOWARD
ALTERNATIVES THAT PROMOTE GREATER SELF-DETERMINATION 82 (2018);
BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 16–20. See generally Jan Ellen Rein, Clients with
Destructive and Socially Harmful Choices—What’s an Attorney to Do?: Within and
Beyond the Competency Construct, 62 FORD. L. REV. 1101 (1994).
19. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 10; ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY
ILL IN AMERICA 1–2 (2d ed. 1949) (indicating remedies for mental disabilities in-
cluded exorcism).
20. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 9–10; Brucken et al., supra note 17.
21. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 10.
22. Id.
23. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 10–18; Brucken et al., supra note 17, at
1023.
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preventing or prohibiting individuals with disabilities from entering
into contracts.  For instance, courts denied deaf24 people the capac-
ity to enter into contracts by deeming them idiots under the law.25
By the mid-1800s, the English courts indicated that mental in-
capacity could be raised as a defense to the enforcement of a con-
tract if one party knew or should have known of the other party’s
questionable capacity.26  American courts followed suit.  For in-
stance, in the early American case Burke v. Allen,27 the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire noted in dicta that insanity could be
raised as a defense to the enforcement of a promissory note.28  The
court in Farmers Bank v. Public Service Company29 succinctly
traced the history of the mental incapacity doctrine in contracts,
noting the doctrine was initially rejected by English courts that ar-
gued “no man of full age shall in any plea set up his own insanity as
a defense to his act.”30  The courts ultimately accepted this plea:
“[t]he doctrine that a person shall not be allowed to stultify himself
. . . is now exploded, and under modern decisions the right of an
alleged insane person to avoid his contracts generally depends upon
the degree of his incapacity.”31
This shift in judicial willingness to accept the plea was tem-
pered by concerns about the need for certainty in the enforceability
of contracts—an idea motivated by the industrialization of America
in the 19th century.  America’s economy shifted from agriculture to
24. There is an ongoing debate about whether and when to capitalize the
word “deaf.”  According to Gallaudet University, lowercase deaf can be used to
identify the audiological condition of being unable to hear, hard of hearing, or
when the deaf person indicates that this is their preference.  Uppercase Deaf is
used to describe those who identify as belonging to a cultural and linguistic minor-
ity, or those who indicate that this is their preference. FAQ, GALLAUDET U., http:/
/bit.ly/GallU [https://perma.cc/U9UQ-ZAUV] (last visited Nov. 7, 2018).  The Uni-
versity does not take a position on which to use; nor does the National Association
of the Deaf.  The National Center on Disability and Journalism recommends using
the lowercase to refer to the audiological condition, or when the person self-de-
scribes as deaf, and uppercase for those who identify as members of the Deaf com-
munity or self-describe as Deaf. Disability Language Style Guide, NAT’L CTR. ON
DISABILITY & JOURNALISM, http://bit.ly/NCDJStyle [https://perma.cc/3X4H-
WFG7] (last updated 2018).  Because I do not know which of these past litigants
would have chosen, I will opt to use the lowercase deaf throughout this essay.
25. GAW, supra note 1, at 82; see LOWELL J. MYERS, THE LAW AND THE DEAF
50 (Max Friedman ed. 1967).
26. Molton v. Camroux, 2 Ex. 487, 154 Eng. Rep. 584 (1848), aff’d, 4 Ex. 17,
154 Eng. Rep. 1107 (1849); Brucken et al., supra note 1, at 1023.
27. Burke v. Allen, 29 N.H. 106 (1854).
28. Id. at 111.
29. Farmers Bank v. Pub. Serv. Co., 13 F. Supp. 548 (W.D. Ky. 1936).
30. Id. at 550.
31. Id.
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manufacturing, and commercial law developed as a way to en-
courage this revolution.32  Contract law was concerned with the
promotion of commerce and was connected intimately to the 19th
century idea of the free market.33  Avoidance of liability created
uncertainty about the enforceability of contracts.34  This uncertainty
is bad for commerce, and the judiciary was skeptical of any doctrine
that created doubt.35  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts con-
tinues to reflect this ambivalence, as it provides the competing poli-
cies of protecting the commercial expectations of the parties must
be balanced against the societal interest in protecting those with a
mental disability.36
Initially, the law was concerned primarily about the property of
the person with questionable capacity rather than the treatment of
the person.37  Correspondingly, the law focused on who should bear
the cost and financial responsibility for those unable to provide for
themselves economically due to their disability or society’s response
to their disability.38  The scope of the law expanded beyond pecuni-
ary concerns, as it wrestled with, and continues to wrestle with, is-
sues such as the degree to which a person with a mental disability
32. See GILMORE, supra note 11, at 8 (“Commercial law, to lawyers, means
the law relating to the sale and distribution of goods-thus, the law of sales, the law
of carriers, the law of shipping; to the modes of extending credit and making pay-
ment for goods sold—thus, the law of negotiable instruments. . . . In a word, this is
the law which the Industrial Revolution left in its wake.”); see also, FARNSWORTH,
supra note 11, at 30.
33. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 20; FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 29–31.
34. The concern about preserving contracts to create certainty and to protect
the expectations of contracting parties is explicitly referred to in the comments to
section 15 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  Courts also recognize this policy.
See, e.g., Ortelere v. Teachers’ Ret. Bd., 25 N.Y.2d 196, 205 (N.Y. 1969).
35. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 91.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. a.
37. DEUTSCH, supra note 19, at 40.  The concern about the health and well-
being of those with mental disabilities seems to have begun with the development
of the field of psychiatry.  As the field of knowledge grew, so too did the societal
and legal concern about protecting those with mental disabilities.  Previously, the
societal concern focused on protecting society from the disabled; see BRAKEL ET
AL., supra note 1, at 14.
38. One of the core projects of the Disability Rights Movement has been to
challenge the medical model of disability.  Many advocates adopt the social model
of disability, which holds that it is not the disability itself that creates barriers to
people but rather society’s response or refusal to include those with challenges that
creates the disability.  For a discussion of the social model of disability, see JAMES
I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US 7–8 (1998); Arlene S. Kanter,
The Law: What’s Disability Studies Got to Do with It or an Introduction to Disabil-
ity Legal Studies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403, 419–31 (Winter, 2011) [here-
inafter Kanter, The Law].
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may manage her assets and exercise rights such as marrying, voting,
and entering into contracts.
The recent case of Jenny Hatch is illustrative.39  Ms. Hatch is a
person with Down Syndrome.  Her parents petitioned to place her
in a guardianship with them appointed as her guardians.  Ms.
Hatch’s parents alleged that she did not have the mental capacity to
make decisions for herself, including decisions about finances,
health, relationships, residence, and education.  They sought com-
plete control over every aspect of Ms. Hatch’s life.  In a remarkable
decision, the court ordered a one-year limited guardianship that
would later transition into a new model of supported decision-mak-
ing.40  This case, and the court’s decision to use a new model for
balancing the interests of the person with questionable capacity and
the interests of broader society, reflects the ongoing issue of how
the law should intervene in cases involving persons with mental
disabilities.
B. Standards for Measuring Mental Incapacity
The law presumes that a person who has not been adjudicated
incompetent has the mental capacity to enter into a valid contract.41
Generally, contracts entered into by people who have been adjudi-
cated legally incompetent due to a mental disability are void as a
matter of law.42  In most jurisdictions, and under the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, contracts entered into by people who are
mentally incapacitated to some degree, but who have not been de-
39. Theresa Vargas, Woman with Down Syndrome Prevails Over Parents in
Guardianship Case, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2013, https://wapo.st/1NSGlrm [https://
perma.cc/T2BH-872E].
40. Id.  The concept of supported decision-making has emerged as a viable
substitute for guardianships, both plenary and limited.  It has received extensive
attention, both domestically and internationally.  For an introduction to the model,
see generally NAT’L. COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 18; Nina A. Kohn et al.,
Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship?, 117 PENN. ST.
L. REV. 1111 (Spring 2013); Michael L. Perlin, ”Striking for the Guardians and
Protectors of the Mind”: The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Mental
Disabilities and the Future of Guardianship Law, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1159
(2013).
41. Butler v. Harrison, 578 A.2d 1098, 1098 (D.C. 1990); Citizens State Bank
v. Ruebel, No. 10-1028, 2011 WL 3116243, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011); Estate of
McGovern v. Commonwealth, 517 A.2d 523, 527 (Pa. 1986); HOWARD O. HUNTER,
MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2:14 (updated Mar. 2017).
42. See Kenai Chrysler Ctr., Inc. v. Denison, 167 P.3d 1240, 1248 (Alaska
2007); James B. Nutter & Co. v. Black, 123 A.3d 535, 543 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2015); Breaux v. Allied Bank of Texas, 699 S.W.2d 599, 602 (Tx. App. 1985); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 13 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
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clared legally incompetent, are voidable not void.43  One can be
deemed legally incompetent if the mentally disabling condition sat-
isfies the legal test for incompetency.44  For legal purposes, a major-
ity of jurisdictions provide that mental incapacity can manifest
either cognitively or volitionally.  Under contract law, cognitive in-
capacity is defined as the inability to understand the nature of the
transaction or its consequences.45  Volitional incapacity is defined
as the inability to control one’s actions related to the transaction,
even though the individual intellectually appreciates the transaction
and its consequences.46
The person claiming incompetency to avoid a contract has the
burden of proving her incompetency and that she was incompetent
at the time of contracting;47 a general claim of incompetency is in-
sufficient to support a claim for rescission.48  Even a diagnosis of
dementia or Alzheimer’s disease,49 arteriosclerosis,50 or other men-
43. Erkins v. Alaska Tr., LLC, 355 P.3d 516, 519–20 (Alaska 2015); Atkinson
v. McCulloh, 132 A. 148, 151 (Md. 1926); Farnum v. Silvano, 540 N.E.2d 202, 204
(Mass. App. Ct. 1989); Ortelere, 250 N.E.2d at 465; Faber v. Sweet Style Mfg.
Corp., 242 N.Y.S.2d 763, 766 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963); Breaux, 699 S.W.2d at 602;
Hauer v. Union State Bank of Wautoma, 532 N.W.2d 456, 460 (Wis. Ct. App.
1995); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 15 cmt. d; 5 WILLISTON ON CON-
TRACTS § 10.3 (4th ed. 2019); Lawrence A. Frolik & Mary F. Radford, “Sufficient”
Capacity: The Contrasting Capacity Requirements for Different Documents, 2
NAT’L ACAD. ELDER L. ATT’YS J. 303, 317 (2006).  Some states have statutes that
provide this standard. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 38, 39 (West 2019); DEL. CODE ANN.
§ 2705 (West 2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-3-24 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 32-108 (West 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-01-02 (West 2019).
44. Henry Weihofen, Mental Incompetency to Contract or Convey, 39 S. CAL.
L. REV. 211, 215 (1966).
45. See Brown v. United Mo. Bank, N.A., 78 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir. 1996)
(citing McElroy v. Mathews, 263 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Mo. 1953)); Brisacher v. Tracy-
Collins Trust Co., 277 F.2d 519, 522 (10th Cir. 1960); McAllister v. Schettler, 521
A.2d 617, 621 (Del. Ch. 1986) (citing G.A.S. v. S.I.S., 407 A.2d 253, 257 (Del. Fam.
Ct. 1978)); Sparrow v. Demonico, 960 N.E.2d 296, 301 (Mass. 2012) (citing Wright
v. Wright, 29 N.E. 380, 382 (Mass. 1885)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 15; HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2:14 (rev. ed.
1993) [hereinafter HUNTER].
46. Ortelere, 250 N.E.2d at 464–65; Blatt v. Manhattan Med. Grp., P.C., 519
N.Y.S.2d 973, 976 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 15.
47. Butler v. Harrison, 578 A.2d 1098, 1100–01 (D.C. 1990); Estate of McGov-
ern v. Commonwealth, 517 A.2d 523, 526 (Pa. 1986); Dubree v. Blackwell, 67
S.W.3d 286, 289 (Tex. App. 2001).
48. See In re McCraw v. Watkins, 249 S.E.2d 202, 203 (Ga. 1978); Greathouse
v. Vosburgh, 169 N.E.2d 97, 103–04 (Ill. 1960); Sutherland State Bank v. Furgason,
186 N.W. 200, 206 (Iowa 1922); In re Knutson’s Estate, 82 N.W.2d 196, 199–200
(Wis. 1957); Weihofen, supra note 44, at 219.
49. In re Lewis-Pride, 330 B.R. 660, 662 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005) (Alzheimer’s);
Stave v. Estate of Rutledge, 127 P.3d 365, 368-69 (Mont. 2005) (Alzheimer’s);
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tally debilitating conditions such as depression51 or post-traumatic
stress disorder52 will not alone support a finding of mental incom-
petency.53  In Rawlings v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Company,54 the husband of decedent Ms. Rawlings challenged her
removal of her husband and substitution of her brother as the des-
ignated beneficiary on her life insurance policy.  Ms. Rawlings was
an alcoholic and in 1997 was diagnosed with senile dementia and
depression; she changed her life insurance policy in 1998.  Despite
the prior diagnosis of dementia, the court upheld the decedent’s
change of beneficiary form.55
Conversely, the absence of a permanent, degenerative mental
condition does not preclude a finding of mental incapacity.56  There
must be either lay or medical testimony describing how, on the day
of the transaction, the condition rendered the person mentally in-
competent in accordance with the legal definition of incompe-
tency.57  The claimant may also have to prove that the other
contracting party had notice of the incompetency.58  The other
party then has the burden of proving the contract was entered into
in good faith, was fair, and was entered into before the complainant
was adjudicated incompetent.59  Some courts put the burden on the
person seeking to enforce the contract and require this individual
show they had no notice of the incompetency.60  If the parties have
performed under the contract, most courts add one more require-
ment to contract avoidance:  the incompetent person must be able
Rawlings v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 291, 297 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2001) (dementia).
50. Gindhart v. Skourtes, 530 P.2d 827, 829 (Or. 1975).
51. Cullinane v. Estate of Vene, No. 305030, 2012 WL 2362441, at *4 (Mich.
Ct. App. June 21, 2012); Uribe v. Olson, 601 P.2d 818, 820 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
52. Lang v. Tewksbury Twp., No. 10-2564, 2012 WL 503677, at *5 (D.N.J.
2012).
53. Uribe, 601 P.2d at 820; Brucken et al., supra note 17, at 1032; and cases
cited therein.
54. Rawlings v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 291 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2001).
55. Id. at 299.  The court may have been influenced by the fact that the dece-
dent’s husband had earlier declared his intention to seek a divorce from the
decedent.
56. Sparrow v. Demonico, 960 N.E.2d 296, 330–31 (Mass. 2012).
57. See Rawlings, 78 S.W.3d at 298; see also Sparrow, 960 N.E.2d at 304–05.
58. Atkinson v. McCulloh, 132 A. 148, 151 (Md. 1926); Faber v. Sweet Style
Mfg. Corp., 242 N.Y.S.2d 763, 766 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981). But see Brown v. Fin. Enters.
Corp., 188 B.R. 476, 485 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (indicating avoidance of contract
does not depend on knowledge of incompetence).
59. Faber, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 766; HUNTER, supra note 45, § 2:15.
60. HUNTER, supra note 45, § 2:15.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-2\DIK201.txt unknown Seq: 13 11-FEB-20 9:52
2020] CONTRACTUAL INCAPACITY 265
to restore the value of that which she has received.61  However,
other courts have held that if the competent person knows of the
incapacity, the court may not require the incompetent party to pro-
vide restitution.62
II. DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ADA
The ADA, enacted in 1990 and amended in 2008,63 is deemed
one of the most influential statutes enacted in the United States
that governs the rights of the disabled.64  The ADA prohibits a
broad range of actors from discriminating against people with disa-
bilities, including public entities and private entities that provide
public opportunities and services.  Title III of the ADA is the pri-
mary provision discussed in this essay.
To bring a cause of action under Title III, the plaintiff must
establish three elements.  First, the person must be disabled within
the meaning of the statute.  Second, the defendant must be covered
by the statute.  And third, the disabled person must have been dis-
criminated against based on her disability as defined within the stat-
ute.  Having established the elements of the cause of action, the
defendant may have a defense to liability as provided by the statute.
As to the first element, the ADA defines an individual as hav-
ing a disability if65  1) an individual has a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of
such individual; 2) an individual has a record of such impairment; or
3) the individual is being regarded as having such an impairment.66
The third prong of this definition is of particular interest for pur-
61. See Flach v. Gottschalk Co. of Balt. City, 41 A. 908, 909 (Md. 1898);
Faber, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 766; Hauer v. Union State Bank, 532 N.W.2d 456, 464 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1995); 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 10:6 (4th ed. 1990); Weihofen,
supra note 44, at 231; HUNTER, supra note 45, § 2:15.
62. See Kenai Chrysler Ctr., Inc. v. Denison, 167 P.3d 1240, 1248 (Alaska
2007); Pappert v. Sargent, 847 P.2d 66, 70 (Alaska 1993); WILLISTON, supra note
61, § 10:6; 53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally Impaired Persons § 165 (2019).
63. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
64. See LAURA ROTHSTEIN & JULIA IRZYK, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW
§ 1:12 (4th ed. 2015).
65. The EEOC has identified a list of impairments that will virtually always
meet the definition of disability under the ADAAA, regardless of which prong of
the statutory definition they are pled.  This list includes “intellectual disability (for-
merly known as mental retardation), autism, major depression, bipolar disorder,
post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia.”
Questions and Answers on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, in EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OP-
PORTUNITY COMMISSION, 2009 WL 4782104 (2009).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012).
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poses of this essay.  This “regarded as” prong is intended to cover
two categories of individuals.
The first category includes individuals who have been discrimi-
nated against under the ADA and who are not disabled.67  These
individuals are mistakenly categorized as being disabled and pro-
hibited actions have been taken against them.  In Horgan v. Sim-
mons,68 the plaintiff challenged his firing under the ADA, arguing
that the defendant fired him because he was HIV positive.  The de-
fendant argued the plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action
under the ADA because his HIV status did not constitute a disabil-
ity therein.  The court noted that regardless of whether HIV status
constituted a disability, the plaintiff established a cause of action
under the ADA because the defendant regarded him as having a
disability.69
The second category includes individuals who actually have a
disability and were subjected to actions prohibited by the ADA.70
Individuals in this category may include people with disabilities
who cannot easily meet the “substantially limits” or “major life ac-
tivities” components contained in the first prong’s definition of dis-
ability.71  Congress intended this category to specifically address the
issue of discrimination against “individuals who are subject to
myths, stereotypes[,] and biases about individuals with
disabilities.”72
As to the second requirement the defendant must prove under
the ADA, Title III includes private entities that provide certain
public accommodations.  The Title III list of such providers is com-
prehensive and includes, among others, places of lodging, establish-
ments serving goods or drinks, places of entertainment, and
banks.73  As to the third element, Title III of the ADA prohibits
67. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987) (citing South-
eastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405–06 n.6 (1979); Adair v. City of
Muskogee, 823 F.3d 1297, 1304–06 (10th Cir. 2016) (containing a succinct discus-
sion of the evolution of this ADA standard); DiGiosia v. Aurora Health Care, Inc.,
48 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1215 (E.D. Wis. 2014); Kevin Barry et al., Pleading Disability
After the ADAAA, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 1, 10–11 (2013).
68. Horgan v. Simmons, 704 F. Supp. 2d 814 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
69. Id. at 820 n.4.
70. See Estate of Murray v. UHS of Fairmount, Inc., No. 10-2561, 2011 WL
5449364, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2011); Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 146 F.
Supp. 2d 82 (D. Me. 2001).
71. Arline, 480 U.S. at 283; RUTH COLKER & PAUL D. GROSSMAN, THE LAW
OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 50–51 (8th ed. 2013).
72. COLKER & GROSSMAN, supra note 71, at 51; When is Individual Regarded
as Having, or Perceived to Have, Impairment Within Meaning of Americans with
Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(C)), 148 A.L.R. FED. 305, 2 (2019).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2012).
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private entities covered by the statute from discriminating against
an individual “on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoy-
ment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or ac-
commodations of any place of public accommodation by any person
who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accom-
modation.”74  Additionally, Title III declares:
[It is] discriminatory to subject an individual or class of individu-
als on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or
class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrange-
ments, to a denial of the opportunity of the individual or class to
participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privi-
leges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity.75
If the defendant is guilty of violating Title III, injunctive relief from
future violations is the remedy available to a private citizen.76
Applying the definitions and other provisions of Title III to the
hypothetical Renchard case, had Prince William Marine Sales, Inc.
refused to sell the yacht to Mr. Renchard because he was a person
with a mental disability, he could have asserted a cause of action for
unlawful discrimination under the ADA.  To do so, Mr. Renchard
would have to establish that he was a person with a disability as
defined by the statute.  This would require him to show the follow-
ing:  1) he has a mental or physical impairment; 2) the impairment
impacts one or more major life activities; and 3) the impairment
substantially limits the major life activities identified.77  Mr.
Renchard could have used his profound deafness, coupled with his
learning disabilities, to satisfy this requirement.  The second ele-
ment of the cause of action would be easy to satisfy; as a seller/
lender, Prince William would qualify as a private entity providing
public accommodations within the purview of the statute.78  Third,
the denial of the sale and the loan based on Mr. Renchard’s disabil-
ity would qualify as discriminatory acts prohibited by the statute, as
this refusal would have denied him the opportunity to avail himself
of the goods and services provided by the Prince William.  The
ADA prohibits parties from refusing to sell or make loans based on
74. Id. § 12182(a).
75. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i).
76. Id. § 12188(a)(1).  The limitation of remedy for private citizens to injunc-
tive relief has been criticized as limiting the effectiveness of Title III.  Ruth Colker,
ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377,
402–03 (2000).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
78. Id. § 12181(7)(F).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-2\DIK201.txt unknown Seq: 16 11-FEB-20 9:52
268 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:253
an actual or perceived disability, and such actions would provide
any potential purchaser with a cause of action under the ADA.79
III. THE QUESTIONABLE VALUE OF THE MENTAL INCAPACITY
DOCTRINE IN LIGHT OF THE ADA AND THE DRM
The hypothetical Renchard case, in which the seller/lender ref-
uses to enter into a contract with a potential client due to perceived
or actual disabilities, illustrates the facial and philosophical tension
between the mental incapacity doctrine and the ADA, particularly
in light of the DRM.  This essay seeks to resolve the tension be-
tween the mental incapacity doctrine and the ADA by limiting the
situations in which people with mental disabilities and their repre-
sentatives can assert the doctrine.  Specifically, I argue the mental
incapacity doctrine should be raised only by those who have been
adjudicated incompetent and were subject to a plenary guardian-
ship80 at the time they entered into the contract.81  In this section, I
offer two principle arguments to support this proposal.  First, re-
stricting the doctrine would support the DRM goals of challenging
stereotypic portrayals of people with mental disabilities and ensur-
ing the total societal integration of people with disabilities.  Second,
relying on rationality to measure the validity of transactions en-
tered into by people with mental disabilities is misguided, is chal-
lenged by behavioral economics, and undermines the autonomy of
people with mental disabilities.
Parts A and B discuss the way in which the mental incapacity
doctrine constructs disability by using disability myths and stereo-
types and the response by the DRM and the ADA to this construc-
tion.  Part C discusses the DRM goal of integration and the way in
which the mental incapacity doctrine undermines this goal.  Part D
explores two challenges to rationality as a basis for justifying the
use of the mental incapacity doctrine to intervene in contracts en-
tered into by people with mental disabilities:  1) behavioral eco-
nomics; and 2) the dignity of risk.  Part E considers some of the
79. Id. § 12102(h); see Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 146 F. Supp. 2d 82, 85
(D. Me. 2001).
80. Guardianship here is used to encompass the two distinct, concepts of
guardianships and conservatorships.  Generally, guardianships confer authority on
one person to act on behalf of the person subject thereto in personal matters such
as health decisions.  Conservatorships confer authority over the assets of the per-
son who has been adjudicated incompetent.
81. Limiting the ability of those subject to a guardianship to enter into con-
tracts is itself problematic.  However, that topic warrants its own essay and thus
while acknowledging the serious issues surrounding guardianship, they are beyond
the scope of this essay.
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potential risks involved in restricting the mental incapacity doctrine
as proposed in this essay.
A. The Mental Incapacity Doctrine, Social Construction of
Disability, and Stereotyping
The mental incapacity doctrine socially constructs of the con-
cept of disability.  To say that disability is socially constructed does
not mean it is not real.82  Such social construction results in tangi-
ble, significant consequences for the lives of people with disabilities.
The mental incapacity doctrine supports the misperception that
simply having a mental disability justifies restrictions on one’s rights
and liberties, including the ability to enter into a binding contract.83
Thus, its impact extends far beyond the actual number of people
whose contracts are avoided based on the doctrine.
Most disability rights activists have adopted the social, as op-
posed to the medical, model of disability.84  The social model of
disability is premised on the idea that identity is largely socially
constructed.85  Thus, social, economic, religious, and political insti-
tutions all shape the identity of individuals with impairments:
[T]he social model of disability . . . holds that disability is not a
physical condition pertaining to a ‘defective’ or ‘inferior’ or ‘ab-
normal’ body but rather a social condition brought about by so-
82. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1298 (1991)
[hereinafter Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins].
83. See Perlin, supra note 14, at 18 (arguing that judges and juries rely on
stereotypes in their decision making about the rights of people with mental
disabilities).
84. Michael Oliver generally is recognized as having articulated this concept
as in the context of disability rights. MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLE-
MENT: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH (1990); Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) (race); Kanter, supra note 38, at 420; Adam M.
Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of Disability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251,
1251 (2007) [hereinafter Samaha].
85. This concept has been explored extensively by scholars in the context of
race, gender, and sexual identity.  Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993) (race); Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 82
(race and gender); Jessica Knouse, Intersexuality and the Social Construction of
Anatomical Sex, 12 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 135 (2005) (sexual identity);
Rhonda Reaves, “There’s No Crying in Baseball”: Sports and the Legal and Social
Construction of Gender, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 283 (2001); Karen J. Sneddon,
Not Your Mother’s Will: Gender, Language, and Wills, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1535
(2015) (gender); Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward
a Social and Legal Conceptualization of Gender that is More Inclusive of Trans-
gender People, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253 (2005) (gender and sexual identity).
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cial norms, practices, and beliefs; it is both socially produced and
socially the particularities of specific bodies.86
Obstacles in the built environment present a straightforward
illustration of this concept.  A student with a physical impairment
who uses a mobility device could not easily attend schools not
equipped with elevators or ramps.  This results in the exclusion of
that student from educational opportunities, not because of her in-
ability to learn, but due to her inability to access the classroom.  It is
not the physiological condition that creates the disability; it is the
social failure to provide the means of access that creates the barrier
and thus creates the disability.
In the context of mental disability, a person with a physiologi-
cal or psychological impairment is not inherently mentally disabled.
Rather, it is the trait coupled with society’s response to that trait
that creates the disability.87  Thus, society may bar a person with a
mental impairment from voting, marrying, or attending school.  The
law contributes to creating impediments for people with mental dis-
abilities.  To be a person with a mental disability can mean, inter
alia, not having the capacity to enter into valid, binding contracts.
Thus, the law converts mental disability into legal disability.  This
has significant material consequences for individuals with mental
disabilities.
One of the ways in which the mental incapacity doctrine con-
structs disability identity is by relying on and reifying stereotypic
myths or tropes.  Satisfying the requirements of the doctrine invites
this negative social construction of identity.  Contract avoidance re-
quires the person claiming volitional mental incompetency to prove
that, at the time of contracting, the other party to the contract knew
or should have known of her incompetency.  Individuals claiming
cognitive incapacity must establish they did not have the ability to
understand the nature of the transaction.  Under either test, evi-
dence offered by the person with questionable competency or their
representative to establish incompetency often includes both lay
and expert opinion testimony.88
86. CIVIL DISABILITIES: CITIZENSHIP, MEMBERSHIP, AND BELONGING 4
(Nancy J. Hirschmann & Beth Linker eds., 2015).
87. Samaha, supra note 84.
88. Milton D. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Ma-
jor Premise, 53 YALE L.J. 271, 275 (1944).  Failure to provide either type of evi-
dence will result in the failure of the party seeking avoidance to overcome the
presumption of legal capacity.  Sparrow v. Demonico, 960 N.E.2d 296, 298 (Mass.
2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-2\DIK201.txt unknown Seq: 19 11-FEB-20 9:52
2020] CONTRACTUAL INCAPACITY 271
Both lay and expert testimony draw on stereotypic evidence to
support the claim of mental incapacity.  In doing so, the law gives
meaning to the social construct of mental disability.  In his essay
“An Archive and Anatomy of Disability Myths,” Jay Dolmage pro-
vides a taxonomy of disability myths, stereotypes, and tropes.89
These include the presentation of disability as pathological or as a
cause for pity or charity and the universal, inevitable linkage be-
tween physical and mental disability—otherwise known as disabil-
ity drift.
1. Disability as Pathology
Disability as pathology undergirds the medical model of disa-
bility.  Disability is defined as a medical condition or disease with-
out accounting for the social context that may shape the experience
of the person with the impairment.  The social restrictions imposed
on people with intellectual disabilities reflect this pathological con-
cept of disability.
The educational exclusion of students with intellectual disabili-
ties was justified based on the impairment of those students.  When
Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children’s
Act90 in 1975, it found that almost one-half of the approximate
eight million children with disabilities living in the United States
received an inadequate education, and one million received no edu-
cation at all.91  Educational institutions conceptualized the intellec-
tual impairment as a disease or medical failing and did not consider
how failure to create environments in which students with intellec-
tual disabilities could learn contributed to the students’
disabilities.92
Disability as a pathology is an interesting concept, particularly
when a claimant fails to conform to certain social norms.  For exam-
ple, courts may treat nonconformity with gender roles as evidence
of a medically based mental disability.  Courts give little, if any,
89. JAY TIMOTHY DOLMAGE, DISABILITY RHETORIC 31–61 (2014).  An ear-
lier cataloguing by Wolf Wolfensberger reflects similar stereotypes. WOLF
WOLFENSBERGER, THE PRINCIPLE OF NORMALIZATION IN HUMAN SERVICES
16–24 (1972).
90. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, P.L. 94-142, 89 Stat.
773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2017)). The statute has since
been renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
91. Id. § 3, 89 Stat. at 774.
92. Cf. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (finding the
school board had an affirmative duty to provide publicly supported education
suited to the needs of each child and discussing how failure to do so precluded
“exceptional” children, who could not afford private instruction, from obtaining an
education).
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consideration to the social construction of gender and how failure
to follow gender norms may be construed by lay jurors and experts
alike as evidence of mental disability.93
In Associates Financial Services Company of Wisconsin v. Har-
rell,94 a woman used her gender nonconformity as a basis for chal-
lenging her mental capacity.  Mrs. Harrell and her husband applied
to Associates Financial Services Company of Wisconsin (“Associ-
ates”) for a mortgage loan.  Associates approved the loan, and the
couple appeared at the office to sign the loan documents.  The loan
was secured by a mortgage on the couple’s property.  The Harrells
defaulted on the loan payments, and Associates sued to foreclose.
After the court granted Associates’ motion for summary judgment,
Mrs. Harrell challenged the foreclosure on the basis she was men-
tally incompetent and thus not bound by the loan agreement.95  To
support her claim of incompetency, she submitted an affidavit in
which she was generally described as having a “blank appearance”
and as being “disheveled in that her hair, make-up, and clothing are
always in disorder, and that she stares inappropriately and is influ-
enced easily.”96  On this basis, Ms. Harrell alleged that Associates
knew or should have known of her incompetence.97  The court re-
jected Ms. Harrell’s claim of incompetence and upheld summary
judgment.
Implicit in the description of Mrs. Harrell’s general appearance
is the assumption that a “normal” woman would not allow herself
to be seen in public with disheveled hair, badly applied makeup,
and disordered clothes.  Similar statements about the decedent in
Allore v. Jewell98 can be read not as describing a woman lacking
capacity but describing a woman failing to conform to gender
norms.  The decedent was described as being immodest and dirty,
having poor table manners, and using profane and vulgar lan-
guage.99  This testimony was used to prove her lack of mental ca-
93. Commentators have urged courts to be more cognizant of changing social
norms and not to draw conclusions based on unconventionality. See Alexander M.
Meiklejohn, Contractual and Donative Capacity, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 307, 371
(1988).
94. Assoc. Fin. Servs. Co. v. Harrell, No. 97-0698, 1997 Wisc. App. LEXIS
1401, *1 (WI App. 4 Dec. 4, 1997) (unpublished table decision).
95. Id. at *6.
96. Id. at *3.
97. Id.
98. Allore v. Jewell, 94 U.S. 506 (1876).
99. Id. at 508–09.
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pacity; read another way, it describes a woman not conforming to
the stereotypical behavior of a woman.100
Similarly, in the Matter of Josiah Oakes,101 a sixty-seven-year-
old man challenged his confinement in an insane asylum.  Oakes’s
sons had involuntarily committed their father primarily to prevent
him from marrying the much younger woman to whom he became
engaged a few days after the death of his wife.  Unsurprisingly, the
man was wealthy, and his sons may have been concerned about los-
ing their inheritance.  Oakes failed to conform to the expectations
of a man of his class and age.  The younger woman whom he
wanted to marry was said to be of questionable reputation; the sons
had her prosecuted for lewdness of character.102  As his wife lay
dying, Oakes left the house and spent the evening with his soon-to-
be fiancé.  He failed to show appropriate grief about his wife’s
death.103  The court reviewed these actions and accepted them as
evidence of his insanity.104
Probably the most infamous case involving allegations of
mental incompetence based on failure to adhere to gender norms is
Buck v. Bell.105  Carrie Buck was committed to the Virginia State
Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded and had been sterilized
while in custody.  She later sued the state, arguing the statute al-
lowing for such procedures was unconstitutional.  The Supreme
Court upheld the statute with Justice Holmes writing his oft-quoted
admonition “three generations of imbeciles are enough.”106  Exten-
sive research reveals that neither Carrie, her mother, nor Carrie’s
daughter were imbeciles.  Instead, there is significant evidence to
suggest Carrie and her mother were labeled imbeciles because of
their alleged sexual activity outside of marriage and not because
they had intellectual disabilities.107  Carrie’s failure to adhere to
gender norms implicitly supported her characterization as an
“imbecile.”
100. Conformity with gender norms has been offered as evidence of mental
competency. See Bradburn v. McIntosh, 159 F.2d 925, 929 (10th Cir. 1947)
(“Nancy [the alleged incompetent person] was a good housekeeper and a good
cook; she was clean and dressed neatly.”).
101. In re Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 123 (Mass. 1845).
102. Id. at 123–27.
103. Id. at 126–27.
104. Id. at 127; see also Ring v. Lawless, 60 N.E. 881, 886 (Ill. 1901) (determin-
ing husband’s submission to wife’s control of property and assets is indication of
husband’s mental incapacity).
105. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
106. Id. at 207.
107. Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck
v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 51 (1985).
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2. People with Disabilities as Objects of Pity
People with mental disabilities often are portrayed as sad or
pathetic in mental incapacity cases.  In Farnum v. Silvano,108 the
testimony about the incompetence of the grantor was as follows:
She would lament not hearing from sisters who were dead.  She
would wonder where the people upstairs in her house had gone,
but there was no upstairs to her house. . . .  She became abnor-
mally forgetful.  Frequently she locked herself out of her house
and broke into it, rather than calling on a neighbor with whom
she had left a key. . . .  She hid her cat to protect it from “the cops
. . . looking for my cat.”109
From this description, we imagine a woman who was delu-
sional, senile, irrational, and paranoid.  Perhaps she was all of these
things, but she also was portrayed as an object of pity.  This image
was compounded by the court’s emphasis on the fact that the per-
son to whom she transferred her home was a much younger man,
who did yard work for the grantor.  The court painted a picture of a
pathetic, lonely, older woman infatuated with someone significantly
younger to support the conclusion she was mentally incapacitated.
The court in Flagstaff Realty, Inc. v. Ned110 also portrayed a prop-
erty seller with a mental disability as a person to be pitied.  In hold-
ing that the seller was not liable to the plaintiffs for a brokerage
commission due to incapacity, the court stated, “We would be short
on realism were we to fail to recognize one of life’s more tragic
vicissitudes,”111 referring to the defendant’s mental illness.  The
court presented the defendant-seller as someone to pity and al-
lowed her to avoid her contractual obligation to pay the commis-
sion; the court indicated to hold otherwise would have been
unjust.112
3. Disability Drift
Disability drift, in which the presence of a physical disability is
taken as evidence of a mental disability, may occur in mental inca-
pacity cases.  Physical disabilities cannot serve as the sole basis for
mental incapacity claims.113  However, the physical disability en-
108. Farnum v. Silvano, 540 N.E.2d 202 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
109. Id. at 203.
110. Flagstaff Realty v. Ned, 544 A.2d 385 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
111. Id. at 388.
112. Id. at 388–89.
113. Feinberg v. Leach, 243 F.2d 64, 67–68 (5th Cir. 1957); Page v. Prudential
Life Ins. Co., 120 P.2d 527, 531 (Wash. 1942); Strong v. Holden, 697 S.E.2d 189, 191
(Ga. 2010); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 173 (1963).
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hances the incapacity claim when coupled with evidence of mental
disability.  In the context of contracts, the quintessential example of
disability drift involves individuals who are deaf.
Historically, the law provided that people who were deaf and
mute were presumptively “idiots” and thus lacked the capacity to
enter into contracts as a matter of law.114  The assumption was the
physical inability to hear and speak indicated a concomitant mental
disability.  Courts equated the physical inability to hear with mental
disability and voided contracts entered into by people who were
deaf.  Thus, people who were deaf were legally prohibited from en-
tering into contracts.  Indeed, in the 1800s, deaf individuals could be
adjudicated insane and sent to live in institutions for the mentally ill
based solely on their inability to hear and speak.115  Eventually, the
doctrine evolved and created a rebuttable presumption of incompe-
tency116 which itself gave way to the presumption of competency
granted to hearing people.117  Despite the formal elimination of the
presumption of mental incapacity, and even as scientific research
revealed the fallacy of equating deafness to mental disability, the
law was hesitant to completely disregard deafness in cases involving
the enforcement of contracts.118
The court engaged in disability drift in Fewkes v. Borah.119
There, the court set aside an oil and gas lease based on mental inca-
pacity in which the only evidence of incapacity was that plaintiff
could neither hear nor speak. Culley v. Jones120 is similar in that a
couple, neither of whom could hear or speak, sought to avoid a
contract to sell their land based on fraud.  The court invalidated the
contract, noting that the couple were deaf-mutes and of feeble in-
tellect and thus without the capacity to understand the transac-
tion.121  The plaintiff in Lang v. Derr122 sought to invalidate a
contract that conveyed her interest in her father’s estate based on
114. See Barnett v. Barnett, 54 N.C. 221, 222 (1854) (“In the earlier history of
the law, a person who was born deaf and dumb, was considered to be an idiot.”);
GAW, supra note 1, at 82; MYERS, supra note 25, at 50.
115. GAW, supra note 1, at 79.
116. Brower v. Fisher, 4 Johns. Ch. 441, 444 (N.Y. Ch. 1820); Oliver v. Berry,
53 Me. 206, 206 (1865); In re Alleged Lunacy of Perrine, 5 A. 579, 580 (N.J. Ch.
1886); Alexier v. Matzke, 115 N.W. 251, 252 (Mich. 1908).
117. Barnett, 54 N.C. at 225.
118. MYERS, supra note 25, at 53; see also Carbine v. McCoy, 11 S.E. 651, 652
(Ga. 1890); Selenak v. Selenak, 150 Ill. App. 399, 401 (1909); Larson v. Western
Underwriters, Inc., 87 N.W.2d 883, 885–87 (S.D. 1958).
119. Fewkes v. Borah, 35 N.E.2d 69 (Ill. 1941).
120. Culley v. Jones, 73 N.E. 94 (Ind. 1905).
121. Id. at 96–97.
122. Lang v. Derr, 569 S.E.2d 778 (W. Va. 2002).
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unconscionability.  In invalidating the conveyance, the court noted
the plaintiff was deaf and did not enter “the contract with a full
understanding of its consequences.”123  The language used by the
appellate court is essentially the test used to measure contractual
capacity:  was the plaintiff able to understand the consequences of
the transaction?  The court was implicitly arguing that the appellant
did not have the capacity to enter into the contract and based its
decision, in part, on her inability to hear.
Deafness can play a role in invalidating a contract even if
mental incapacity is not specifically pled.  In Wendell v. Payne,124 a
profoundly deaf man was seriously injured when a train struck him.
As he lay in the hospital recovering from his injuries, representa-
tives from the railroad company approached him to settle any
claims he might make against the company.  They encouraged him
to sign a release of claims in exchange for the company’s agreement
to pay for all his medical bills.  Pursuant to the release, the plaintiff
waived his right to recover against the railroad company for all of
his injuries, pain, suffering, and lost wages.  Ultimately, the plaintiff
challenged the validity of the release.  The court held that the re-
lease was invalid, relying in part on “his infirmity of hearing and
speech.”125
The Renchard case set forth at the beginning of this essay is a
recent case that exemplifies disability drift and the court’s hesitancy
to disregard the plaintiff’s deafness in assessing his claim of mental
incapacity.  In challenging the repossession and sale of his yacht,
Mr. Renchard alleged that he did not have the mental capacity to
understand the agreements he made with the defendant-seller/
lender.  Mr. Renchard asserted he was deaf and could not read or
write sophisticated words.126  In allowing the plaintiff’s case to pro-
ceed, the court indicated Mr. Renchard’s physical disability may
have impacted his ability to understand the nature of the transac-
tions he had entered into.127  The only physical disability the plain-
tiff identified was his deafness; the court did not explain why the
plaintiff’s deafness should be relevant to any mental disability the
plaintiff may have had.  That the plaintiff was purchasing a yacht,
had a trust fund, had figured out how to liquidate that trust fund,
and was able to determine how to purchase a yacht worth $1.4 mil-
123. Id. at 782.
124. Wendell v. Payne, 109 S.E. 734 (W. Va. 1921).
125. Id. at 738.
126. Renchard v. Prince William Marine Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 271,
280–81 (D.D.C. 2015).
127. Id. at 281.
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lion did not persuade the court that the plaintiff had the mental
capacity to enter into contracts concerning the care and mainte-
nance of the yacht.  By inexplicably connecting deafness with
mental disability, the court deployed the myth that the existence of
a physical disability lends support to a claim of mental disability.
The law of mental incapacity helped transform deafness from a
physical condition to a mental disability; in turn, this led to the des-
ignation of deaf people as legally disabled.  While contracts entered
into by deaf people are no longer void or voidable, deafness contin-
ues to be linked with mental disability when mental incapacity is
pled as a basis for avoiding a contract.128  This link is symbolically
important even if the doctrine is pled unsuccessfully.
In all of these mental incapacity cases invoking disability myths
and stereotypes, lay people or medical experts present the testimo-
nial proof.  Somewhat ironically, courts are more likely to give lay
testimony more weight than the testimony of medical experts on
the topic of mental incompetence.129  One court argued, “[T]he req-
uisite proof regarding mental capacity is within the common knowl-
edge and experience of lay persons[,] and therefore, expert
testimony is not required.”130  There has been significant skepti-
cism, and perhaps even fear, that medical testimony about mental
illness and mental disability is unreliable and speculative.131  Some
of that skepticism arises from the field of psychiatry’s relative in-
fancy and its application to the legal field.132  Additionally, al-
though the opinions of medical experts ideally are based on data,
this data may not be sufficient to support an objective opinion con-
128. See, e.g., Lieb v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 232, 235
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Panco v. Rogers, 87 A.2d 770, 773–74 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1952).
129. See Heights Realty, Ltd. v. Phillips, 749 P.2d 77, 80 (N.M. 1988); Faber v.
Sweet Style Mfg. Corp., 242 N.Y.S.2d 763, 768–69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963); Brucken et
al., supra note 17, at 1041 (“The opinions of lay persons present at the transaction
as to a person’s mental ability are often relied on heavily by the courts.”); Green,
Proof of Mental Incompetency, supra note 88, at 284. But see Sparrow v. Demon-
ico, 960 N.E.2d 296, 304 (Mass. 2012) (concluding that “medical evidence is neces-
sary to establish that a person lacked the capacity to contract due to the existence
of a mental condition”).
130. Decker v. Decker, 192 S.W.3d 648, 652 (Tex. App. 2006).
131. See George J. Alexander & Thomas S. Szasz, From Contract to Status via
Psychiatry, 13 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 837, 545–46 (1972); Green, Proof of Mental
Incompetency, supra note 88, at 284–86; Meiklejohn, supra note 93, at 309.  Even
those commentators who have raised the concern about the overreliance on medi-
cal testimony fail to consider the negative consequences of the overreliance on lay
testimony from the perspective of people with disabilities.
132. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 721.
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cerning the person’s capacity when the contract was formed.133
Thus, in the view of one court “. . . in the great majority of cases
psychiatrists of equal qualification and experience will reach dia-
metrically opposed conclusions on the same behavioral evidence.
The courts have, therefore, tended to give less weight to expert tes-
timony than to objective behavioral evidence.”134  Lay testimony,
then, is critical in persuading the fact finder of a person’s
incompetency.135
That the above-quoted court considered lay testimony to be
“objective” is troubling, as is the general practice of courts favoring
lay over expert testimony.136  The judgments and opinions offered
by friends, family, neighbors, and colleagues are not formed in a
vacuum.  Ideas about people with mental disabilities are influenced
and shaped by cultural forces:  the media, education, politics, relig-
ion, and the law all contribute to the conceptualization of mentally
ill and disabled people.  Lay testimony is neither neutral nor objec-
tive; because it operates within a social context, lay testimony can
be subject to stereotypic concepts of people who are mentally ill or
mentally disabled.137
The tests used to measure mental incapacity socially construct
disability.  The requirement that the competent party should have
known essentially demands that the competent party draw conclu-
sions about the person with a mental disability based on the dis-
133. Butler v. Harrison, 578 A.2d 1098, 1100, 1101 (D.C. 1990); Green, Proof,
supra note 88, at 284.
134. Faber, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
135. The reliance on lay testimony to establish incompetency is a long-estab-
lished tradition in Anglo-American law. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 11
(describing that the method of determining the mental status of someone with
questionable competency in the early 1600s in England was through a petition to
the court which sought a determination of competency from a jury of twelve men).
136. I note here that relying on medical expertise is not without its own risks.
In assessing capacity in the guardianship context, statutes require that evidence
from medical experts be submitted to the court as to a person’s capacity or lack
thereof. See Beyond Guardianship, supra note 18, at 77.  Much greater deference
is given to medical expertise than to lay opinions in the context of guardianship
proceedings.  However, the determinations made by such medical experts can be
extremely problematic. See id. at 77–83.
137. Early in the history of the development of the field of psychiatry, this
concern about reliance on extrinsic evidence was expressed.  In 1862, an article
appeared in The British Medical Journal expressing skepticism about the use of
extrinsic evidence to establish insanity. Can the Man Be Morally Insane in Whom
Is Found No Insane Delusion?, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 38, 38–39 (1862); see also Green,
Proof of Mental Incompetency, supra note 88, at 275, 284; Rein, Clients with De-
structive and Socially Harmful Choices—What’s an Attorney to Do?, supra note 18,
at 1119.
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abled person’s outward conduct and appearance.138  Similarly, the
requirement of establishing the person did not understand the
transaction demands the same kind of “parade of horribles.”139  Re-
call that it is the person with a mental disability herself, or more
likely, the person’s informal or formal representative, that must re-
but the presumption of mental competency.140  Thus, the person
with a mental disability or her guardian is called on to use stereo-
types about mental disability to establish incompetency.  Fact find-
ers in court are then empowered to decide whether the evidence of
mental disability comports with their lay understanding of disabil-
ity.141  This is the very kind of judgment the ADA and disability
rights advocates are trying to eliminate.  It is time to rain on the
parade of horribles.
138. The court in McGovern states this expressly:  “. . . a person’s mental ca-
pacity is best determined by his spoken words and his conduct, and . . . the testi-
mony of persons who observed such conduct on the date in question outranks
testimony as to observations made prior to and subsequent to that date.” McGov-
ern, 517 A.2d at 384.
139. Here is one description of a grantor whose conveyance was challenged
based on mental incapacity:
Thus, some of the witnesses speak of the deceased as having low and
filthy habits; of her being so imperfectly clad at times to expose immod-
estly portions of her person; of her eating with her fingers, and having
vermin on her body.  Some of them testify to her believing in dreams, and
her imagining she could see ghosts and spirits around her room, and her
claiming to talk with them; to her being incoherent in her conversation,
passing suddenly and without cause from one subject to another; to her
using vulgar and profane language; to her making immodest gestures; to
her talking strangely, and making singular motions and gestures in her
neighbors’ houses and in the streets.
Allore v. Jewell, 94 U.S. 508–509 (1876); Flagstaff Realty, Inc. v. Ned, 544 A.2d
385, 386 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (“Cora . . . has been diagnosed as a
paranoid schizophrenic who suffers from delusions of persecution, hallucinations
and suicidal thoughts . . . Cora was extremely unstable . . . she was unable to eat or
bathe and was virtually bedridden . . . ‘psychotic and incoherent.’”); In re Estate of
Minton, No. 13-12-00026-CV, 2014 WL 354527, at *2–4 (Tex. App. Jan. 30, 2014).
140. HUNTER, supra note 45, § 2:14.
141. See Ortelere v. Teachers’ Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 450, 468 (N.Y.
1969) (Jasen, J., dissenting) (“In the final analysis, the lay jury will infer the state of
the party’s mind from his observed behavior as indicated by the evidence
presented at trial. Each juror instinctively judges what is normal and what is abnor-
mal conduct from his own experience . . .” (emphasis added)); Green, Proof of
Mental Incompetency, supra note 88, at 283 (“Courts assume that anyone is capa-
ble of forming an opinion as to the mental competency of another and that no
special qualifications are needed, provided that the opinion is based upon facts
observed.”); HUNTER, supra note 45, § 2:14.
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B. Deconstructing Disability: The DRM and the ADA
Not only do the tests for measuring mental incapacity demean
individuals with disabilities, but they also risk violating the ADA.
Disability studies scholars and disability rights advocates appreciate
the role the law can play and has played in socially constructing
disability.  The mental incapacity doctrine obviously predates these
movements and thus does not to take into consideration the con-
cerns articulated by and about people with disabilities.  The law
does not function in a vacuum.  Therefore, it is appropriate to mod-
ify the mental incapacity doctrine in light of the DRM’s competing
values.
The Disability Rights Movement involves several projects,142
the goals of which conflict with or are undermined by the mental
incapacity doctrine.  One project is elimination of stereotypes and
the negative, material consequences they have on the lives of peo-
ple with disabilities.143  In enacting the ADA and its amendments,
Congress expressly found that “people with physical or mental disa-
bilities are frequently precluded from [fully participating in society]
. . . because of prejudice, antiquated attitudes, or the failure to re-
move societal and institutional barriers.”144  Congress continued,
noting the “continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimi-
nation and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity
to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for
which our free society is justifiably famous.”145  The definition of
disability in the ADA, that includes any person perceived as having
a disability, was designed expressly to take into account perceptions
and misconceptions of disability.  The legislative history of the 2008
ADA Amendments Act reveals this congressional intention:  “[t]his
section of the definition of disability [referring to the ‘regarded as’
prong of the definition] was meant to express our understanding
that unfounded concerns, mistaken beliefs, fears, myths, or
prejudice about disabilities are often just as disabling as actual im-
142. This essay adopts the language used by Professor Samuel Bagenstos to
describe the various projects of the Disability Rights Movement.  See SAMUEL
BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVE-
MENT 2–3, 6–33 (2009).
143. Samuel Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma and Disability, 86 VA. L. REV.
397, 433 (2000); see also Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities
Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 427–28 (1991).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2008).
145. Id. § 12101(a)(8).
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pairments.”146  As one disability rights lawyer states, the goal of the
“regarded as” impaired language was to ensure that “prejudice, ste-
reotypes, and neglect based on impairments are now prohibited to
the same extent as they would be in the case of other protected
characteristics.”147
Even before the passage of the ADA, courts recognized people
with disabilities were subjected to certain myths and prejudice.  In
the oft-cited U.S. Supreme Court case School Board of Nassau
County, Florida. v. Arline,148 the Court discussed the definition of
disability within the Rehabilitation Act of 1973—the ADA directly
copied this definition.  In finding that the definition of “handi-
capped person” included someone diagnosed with tuberculosis, the
Court argued that Congress intended the definition to be broad to
acknowledge “that society’s accumulated myths and fears about dis-
ability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limita-
tions that flow from the actual impairment.”149
The concern about eliminating stereotypes encompasses the
desire to eliminate both the stigma associated with mental disability
and the discrimination against and subordination of people with
disabilities.  The subordinate status of people with disabilities in
American society is reflected in statistical surveys; what the statis-
tics reveal is disheartening.  According to the U.S. Census Bureau,
in 2015, only 34.4 percent of people with a disability between ages
21 and 64 were employed.150  In 2014, fewer than 17 percent of
adults with a disability age 25 or older had a bachelor’s degree.151
And in 2015, the median annual income of households that include
working-age people with disabilities was $41,600.152  These statistics
illustrate the ongoing challenge faced by people with disabilities:
146. 154 CONG. REC. S8842 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) (statement of Senate
Managers); accord H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 17 (2008).
147. Kevin Barry, Toward Universalism: What the ADA Amendments Act of
2008 Can and Can’t Do for Disability Rights, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203,
279 (2010).
148. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
149. Id. at 284.
150. C. Lee W. Erickson & S. von Schrader, Disability Statistics from the
American Community Survey (ACS), CORNELL UNIVERSITY YANG-TAN INST.
(click on “find disability statistics” then “employment rate” and select ages 12–64
from the “age” drop down menu and 2015 in the “year” drop down menu).
151. See Bureau of Labor Stat., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, People with a Disability
Less Likely to Have Completed a Bachelor’s Degree, TED: THE ECONOMICS
DAILY (July 20, 2015) https://bit.ly/2mJpwih [https://perma.cc/C34C-LLDF].
152. C. Lee W. Erickson & S. von Schrader, Disability Statistics from the
American Community Survey (ACS), CORNELL UNIVERSITY YANG-TAN INST.
(click on “find disability statistics” then “annual household income” and select
2015 in the “year” drop down menu).
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inclusion.  The stereotypes and the prejudice contribute to the ex-
clusion of those with disabilities.153  Bias limits their life opportuni-
ties, such as employment, housing, and education.154  Their rights to
marry, procreate, vote, and enter into contracts also are negatively
affected by stereotypes and prejudice.  Indeed, no aspect of their
lives is untouched by prejudice.
It is the pervasiveness of harm that triggered disability rights
activists to take action.  In No Pity, Joseph Shapiro chronicles the
way in which the Disability Rights Movement has attacked stere-
otyping and revealed its oppressiveness:
Disabled people have become sensitized to depictions of disabil-
ity in popular culture, religion and history.  There they find con-
stant descriptions of a disabled person’s proper role as either an
object of pity or a source of inspiration.  These images are inter-
nalized by disabled and nondisabled people alike and build social
stereotypes, create artificial limitations, and contribute to
discrimination.155
Shapiro makes a compelling case for the way in which popular
culture, religion, and history contribute significantly to the stereo-
types about individuals with mental disabilities.156  From Shake-
speare’s King Richard III to modern horror films, individuals with
mental disabilities are portrayed as evil and murderous.157  They
are to be feared and, when necessary, segregated from society.158
There is even a study that hypothesized these stereotypes and the
related stigma may result in the disparate treatment of people with
psychiatric disabilities under Title I of the ADA.159  This study
153. See Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of
Welfare, 54 CAL. L. REV. 809, 814–15 (1966).
154. See generally Douglas Kruse et al., Why Do Workers with Disabilities
Earn Less? Occupational Job Requirements and Disability Discrimination, 56 BRIT.
J. OF INDUS. REL. 798 (2017) (demonstrating that lower earnings by people with
disabilities may be the result of discrimination).
155. JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY 30 (1993).
156. Id. at 30–31; see also ALAN GARTNER, IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISA-
BLING IMAGES (Alan Gartner & Tom Joe, eds., 1987); Paul K. Longmore, Screen-
ing Stereotypes: Images of Disabled People in Television and Motion Pictures, in
IMAGES OF THE DISABLED 65 (Alan Gartner & Tom Joe, eds., 1987); Rosemarie
Garland-Thomson, Disability and Representation,120 PMLA 522, 522–23 (2005);
Paul K. Longmore, The Cultural Framing of Disability: Telethons as a Case Study,
120 PMLA 502, 505–08 (2005).
157. FRANK BOWE, HANDICAPPING AMERICA 108–11 (1978).
158. See U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDI-
VIDUAL ABILITIES, 22–26 (1983).
159. See generally Jeffrey Swanson et al., Justice Disparities: Does the ADA
Enforcement System Treat People with Psychiatric Disabilities Fairly? 66 MD. L.
REV. 94 (2006) (conducting a study that “describes and compares the characteris-
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found that people with psychiatric disabilities have significantly
worse outcomes in employment discrimination lawsuits than their
neurotypical counterparts; one possible explanation for this dispa-
rate treatment is the stigma associated with mental disabilities.160
Given the DRM’s values and the goal of deconstructing disa-
bility reflected in the ADA, it is appropriate to restrict the use of
the mental incapacity doctrine to cases in which the claimant was
previously adjudicated incompetent.  At least one court has indi-
rectly expressed support for this approach, albeit for reasons other
than objecting to stereotypes about people with a mental disability:
Financial institutions are not equipped to assess mental condi-
tions of their customers and should not be expected to do so.
The line between the idiosyncratic person and a mildly or even
moderately mentally disturbed person can easily become blurred.
An idiosyncratic person is surely entitled to free access to a
bank’s services, and this freedom would be compromised to any
extent such persons could escape responsibility for their commer-
cial transactions.  Utter chaos would attend a rule that would re-
quire a bank to conduct its customer relations on the basis of its
lay assessment of the customer’s mental condition.161
The dicta in this opinion unintentionally reinforces the position
taken by Congress when enacting the ADA.  It reveals discomfort
with the idea that an entity contracting business with a person can
and should be responsible for diagnosing the mental capacity of a
potential client.  The ADA includes in its definition of disability a
person “regarded as having a disability.”  One of the goals of in-
cluding this language is to attack specifically the kinds of assump-
tions made by lay people about those with disabilities.  This
prohibition inherently challenges the idea that lay people are quali-
fied and should be permitted to draw conclusions about a person’s
mental abilities based on the limited observations of that person.
The court expressed its reservations about the appropriateness of
imposing this responsibility on a bank.
However, the law of mental incapacity seemingly demands that
covered entities engage in the very behavior that disability discrimi-
nation law is trying to prohibit.  It may very well be that jurors ap-
proach the question of mental incompetence by using their own
experiential yardsticks.  However, misconceptions, inaccurate as-
tics of people with psychiatric and non-psychiatric disabilities who filed for em-
ployment discrimination lawsuits under Title I of the ADA”).
160. Id. at 133–34.
161. Putensen v. Hawkeye Bank of Clay Cnty., 564 N.W.2d 404, 408 (Iowa
1997).
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sumptions, and false information about disabilities warp these yard-
sticks.  Reducing the cases in which stereotypic tropes and disability
myths can be used will help to deconstruct—rather than construct
and reinforce—the negative connotations associated with mental
disability.  Limiting the mental incapacity doctrine to instances in
which one party was adjudicated incompetent will help accomplish
this goal.
C. Mental Incapacity Doctrine, Exclusion, and Integration
The mental incapacity doctrine can undermine the DRM and
ADA goal of encouraging and enabling people with mental disabili-
ties to fully participate in society.  Providers of goods and services
subject to both the law of mental incapacity and the ADA face a
dilemma:  they may be reluctant to enter into contracts with people
who are or whom they perceive to be disabled.162  This reluctance
can severely deprive people with disabilities from living a full, rich
life in accordance with their wishes and desires. The ability to enter
into contracts is inextricably tied to the ability to participate fully in
society.  Limiting the mental incapacity doctrine prioritizes the
value of full participation and integration of those with mental
disabilities.
Integration is a core value of the DRM and the ADA.163  Pro-
fessor Jacobus tenBroek, a preeminent disability rights scholar,
equated integration with the concept of “the right to live in the
world”:
The right to live in the world consists in part of the right to live
out of it.  The blind, the deaf, the lame, and the otherwise physi-
cally disabled, have . . . not only the right to rent a home or an
apartment, public or private housing, but the right to live in it;
the right to determine their living arrangements, the conduct of
their lives; the right to select their mates, raise their families, and
receive due protection in the safe and secure exercise of these
rights. . . .  But the world in which the disabled, too, have a right
to live is also . . . in the schools and colleges . . . in the factories,
shops and offices, in short, in all the places where men are, go,
162. Cf. Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Fletcher, 975 S.W.2d 539, 545 (Tex. 1998)
(arguing in dicta that “imposing liability on service providers for dealing with eld-
erly persons discourages such dealings, thereby impairing the elderly’s access to
services they would unquestionably have if younger.  This contravenes sound
policy”).
163. See Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in
the Law of Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 841, 843–47 (1966); see also ALLISON CAREY,
ON THE MARGINS OF CITIZENSHIP (2009); CHARLTON, supra note 38; SHAPIRO,
supra note 155.
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live, work, and play.  The policy of the law . . . should be . . . to
permit, enable and encourage men to be a part of their communi-
ties to the full extent of their physical capacities.164
Although Professor tenBroek was concerned primarily about peo-
ple with physical disabilities, the sentiments expressed apply with
the same force to people with mental disabilities.
Integration became a core value of the DRM largely because
of America’s long history of the physically and socially constructed
exclusion of people with mental disabilities.  In colonial times, when
Europeans were immigrating to and settling in America, survival
was their uppermost concern.165  Immigrants with disabilities were
deemed burdensome and unproductive, and laws in the original 13
colonies excluded people with mental, physical, or emotional disa-
bilities.166  For those with mental disabilities, the state made deci-
sions about the extent they could participate in certain civil aspects
of society.167  Many states proscribed the civic and social participa-
tion of people deemed intellectually incompetent; states prohibited
them from voting, entering into contracts, marrying, and serving on
juries.168
The American Industrial Revolution of the mid-1800s initiated
a shift in the care of, social integration of, and control over people
with mental disabilities.  With the industrialization of America
came the increased emphasis on productivity and the obligation of
citizens to contribute economically to society.169  For people with
intellectual and developmental disabilities, education became the
164. tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World, supra note 163, at 918.
165. DEUTSCH, supra note 37, at 39 (“The settlements were generally sparse
and scattered, populated for the most part by an impecunious people who lived on
the ragged edge of existence, engaged in constant struggle to wrench a bare living
from the soil.”).
166. See, e.g., An Act Directing the Admission of Town Inhabitants, ACTS
AND RESOLVES PASSED BY THE GEN. COURT OF MASS. ch. 23, § 2 (1700-1701);
U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., supra note 158, at 18.
167. The period under discussion was antebellum America; consequently, the
discussion is limited to white people with disabilities.  For a fascinating look at the
treatment and status of slaves with disabilities, see generally DEA BOSTER, AFRI-
CAN AMERICAN SLAVERY AND DISABILITY (2012); Dea Boster, “Unfit for Ordi-
nary Purposes”: Disability, Slaves, and Decision Making in the Antebellum
American South, in DISABILITY HISTORIES, ch. 10, 201 (Susan Burch & Michael
Rembis, eds., 2014) (indicating slaves with disabilities were rendered unfit, defec-
tive, and, in some instances, completely valueless); Anthony R. Chase, Race, Cul-
ture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV.
1, 19–20 (1995); see also Batten v. Faulk, 49 N.C. 233, 233 (N.C. 1856) (“[A] slave
can make no contract. . . . He has no legal capacity to make a contract. He has no
legal mind.”).
168. CAREY, supra note 163, at 2.
169. PHILIP M.  FERGUSON, ABANDONED TO THEIR FATE 7–8 (1994).
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means by which they were converted from consumers to producers.
Schools for people with mental disabilities developed to transform
these individuals into productive members of society.170  Initially,
these schools were private, but their founders were able to convince
various state legislatures that public funds should be allocated for
their administration.171  This led to the social segregation of people
with intellectual disabilities thus beginning the shift from commu-
nity integration.  The segregation was justified as an effort to pro-
vide protection for those with mental disabilities.172
In the latter half of nineteenth century America, schools for
people with mental disabilities, which were directed toward the
training and the social reintegration of “idiots,” gradually morphed
into custodial institutions.  Persons with disabilities confined within
these institutions became permanent residents rather than students
in pursuit of educational training.173  The state became the primary
caregiver and decision-maker for people confined to these institu-
tions.  The shift away from integration to permanent segregation
and exclusion was motivated by and in response to Social Darwin-
ism and its progeny, the eugenics movement.174 The justification for
this isolation shifted from protecting individuals with disabilities
from society to protecting society from those with disabilities.175
The popularity of the institutionalization of people with mental
disabilities continued well into the mid-1960s.176  At this point, sev-
eral forces gathered to push toward deinstitutionalization.  First,
civil rights movements for African Americans, women, Latinx, and
eventually, the LGBQ community, gained momentum during the
1960s and 70s.177  Additionally, parents of children with disabilities
initiated a revolution against institutionalization and began de-
manding different treatment for their children.178  People with disa-
bilities also began to advocate for themselves.179  The idea that
170. JAMES TRENT, INVENTING THE FEEBLE MIND: A HISTORY OF INTELLEC-
TUAL DISABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 8–11 (2017) (citing to Samuel Gridley
Howe’s 1848 Report to the Massachusetts Legislature at 23–24).
171. Id. at 10–11.
172. U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., supra note 158, at 19.
173. Id.; Trent, supra note 170, at 24–30.
174. U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., supra note 158, at 19–20; DEUTSCH, supra note
37, at 354–86; ROBERT WHITAKER, MAD IN AMERICA 41–72 (2002).
175. See U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., supra note 158, at 19–20; CAREY, supra note
163, at 83–104; DEUTSCH, supra note 37, at 350–53.
176. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 17.
177. See CAREY, supra note 163, at 136–37.
178. See id. at 106–32.
179. CHARLTON, supra note 38, at 113–26; INDEPENDENT LIVING FOR PHYSI-
CALLY DISABLED PEOPLE 8, 11–12, (Nancy M. Crewe & Irving Kenneth Zola, eds.,
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people with disabilities should be segregated either for their own
protection or because they were a menace to society subsided; insti-
tutionalization as the preferred method of managing people with
mental disabilities was denounced.  Court cases such as Penn-
sylvania Association for Retarded Children v. the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania,180 Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospi-
tal,181 and ultimately, City of Clebourne v. Clebourne Living
Center182 all supported, to varying degrees, the end of the segrega-
tion of people with mental disabilities.  Mental health professionals,
advocates, and parents argued that people with mental disabilities
should be removed from institutions and cared for either by their
families or in a community setting.183  Public policy shifted from
exclusion to inclusion.184
Federal legislation incorporated the value of inclusion, at least
facially, if not in practice.  The ADA followed several federal stat-
utes designed to effectuate the public policy of integrating people
with disabilities.185  However, courts and governmental agencies
were not diligent in enforcing the statutes.186  Disability rights advo-
cates attempted to remedy this by pushing for the enactment of the
ADA.  The hope was for Congress finally to enact a statute and
subsequent regulations that would be a powerful tool to end the
discrimination against and segregation of people with disabilities.
1983); SHAPIRO, supra note 155, at 117 DUANE F. STROMAN, THE DISABILITY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2003).
180. Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D.
Pa. 1972).
181. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa.
1978), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979).
182. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
183. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 17.
184. One additional factor motivating deinstitutionalization was the desire by
governments, both state and federal, to reduce state spending on institutions for
people with mental disabilities.  President Ronald Reagan led the charge to defund
such institutions, not for policy reasons but rather to save money.  Unfortunately,
those people with mental disabilities who no longer are committed to large state
sponsored institutions have been neglected by federal, state, and local governmen-
tal and society at large.  Michael Perlin has written a compelling article on this
topic. See generally Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and
Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 63 (1991).
185. These statutes include the Architectural Barriers Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 4151–4157; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791–796; and the Edu-
cation for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (now known as
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act).
186. See Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to
Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 393, 399–415 (1991); BOWE, supra note 157, at
31–34.
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The legislative history of the ADA and the statutory language
reveal that discrimination, isolation, and segregation were harms to
be remedied by the statute.  Congress expressly found that “histori-
cally, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities,”187 noting “individuals with disabilities continually en-
counter various forms of discrimination, including outright inten-
tional exclusion.”188  Congress further stated “the Nation’s proper
goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic
self-sufficiency for such individuals.”189  Title III of the ADA specif-
ically provides that “goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages, and accommodations shall be afforded to an individual with a
disability in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of
the individual.”190  These findings made the goals of the statute
unambiguously clear.  The statute itself specifies that entering into
contracts is a strategy that can be used to ensure the full participa-
tion and inclusion of those with disabilities.  The ADA provides
that the refusal of covered entities, including a broad swath of pri-
vate actors, to enter into contracts with the disabled is an act of
discrimination.191
Societal integration is a policy goal embraced by the DRM and
reflected in the ADA.  While there are endless strategies for achiev-
ing this integration, entering into contracts plays a significant role in
accomplishing integration.  The mental incapacity doctrine counter-
acts this goal, as it creates uncertainty for those who may contract
with people with mental disabilities and thus discourages individu-
als from doing so.  This reluctancy to contract challenges the goal of
integration.  Narrowing the scope of the mental incapacity doctrine
reduces the uncertainty of enforcement and encourages people to
engage contractually with people with mental disabilities.
Reluctance to enter into a contract occurred in Dudley v. Han-
naford Brothers Company,192 in which the defendant refused to
enter into a contract with a person perceived as having a disability.
The plaintiff sought to purchase alcohol at a Shop’n Save grocery
store.  The defendant’s employees refused to tender the sale based
on the belief the plaintiff was intoxicated.  The plaintiff had sub-
stantial mental and physical disabilities resulting from injuries sus-
187. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2012).
188. Id. § 12101(a)(5).
189. Id. § 12101(a)(7).
190. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(B).
191. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i).
192. Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 146 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D. Me. 2001).
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tained in an automobile accident.  Despite the plaintiff’s attempt to
explain that he suffered from a disability and was not intoxicated,
the defendant’s employees refused to tender the sale.  Plaintiff
sued, alleging discrimination under Title III of the ADA.  The court
determined the plaintiff stated a cause of action under the ADA.193
A more recent case illustrates a vendor’s reluctance to enter
into a contract with someone perceived as having a mental disabil-
ity.  A woman in her 80s was living independently and fell behind
on her rent.  The landlord agreed to arrange a payment plan but
only if the tenant was assigned a court appointed guardian to man-
age her finances.194  She reluctantly agreed to this appointment to
avoid being evicted.195  Although the woman did not bring a claim
for discrimination under the ADA, this case illustrates the land-
lord’s reluctance to enter into a contract with someone he perceived
to have a mental disability.
In Renchard, the plaintiff desired to purchase a yacht and ar-
range for its care and maintenance.  To do so, Mr. Renchard needed
to enter into contracts with the defendant, Prince William Sales,
Inc.  Based on lack of his own capacity, the plaintiff called the en-
forceability of those contracts into question.  The court’s willingness
to allow the plaintiff to avoid these contracts could have significant
repercussions.  If the defendant subsequently had sought advice
from counsel on whether to enter into a transaction with someone
with disabilities, like the plaintiff in Renchard, prudent counsel
would advise the lender about the possibility of avoidance and re-
scission based on the claim of mental incapacity.  Counsel also
would be obligated to point out that the lender was subject to the
ADA.  At that point, the lender would have to weigh the risk of
avoidance and rescission against the risk of a discrimination claim
under the ADA.  The entity may simply decline to enter into con-
tract with a person whom it suspects may have a mental disability.
As noted by the National Council on Disability, “. . . doctors, land-
lords, bankers, and others may nonetheless refuse to treat, rent to,
193. Id. at 86.
194. Theresa Vargas, This 87-year-old D.C. Woman Just Made it Easier for
You to Keep Your Independence, WASH. POST (June 27, 2018), https://wapo.st/
2nw4zaZ [https://perma.cc/H6W6-5ARB].
195. The case is an interesting one as in the end the senior was able to chal-
lenge her guardianship and have the court use supported decision making instead.
Press Release, Quality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities: D.C. Senior Freed
From Guardianship in Favor of Supported Decision-Making, (June 18, 2018).  The
woman’s success in challenging her guardianship does not obviate the concern
about the reluctance of providers of goods and services to enter into contracts with
those whom they perceive to be people with disabilities.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-2\DIK201.txt unknown Seq: 38 11-FEB-20 9:52
290 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:253
or conduct business with a person they perceive to lack capacity, for
fear that the person is not able to understand what is happening,
which could ultimately expose them to liability.”196  These cases
demonstrate that the mental incapacity doctrine as currently ap-
plied can pose a threat to the goal of integration.
D. Rationality and Mental Incapacity
The mental incapacity doctrine is at odds with the autonomy
and independence goals of the DRM.  One of the underlying policy
justifications for the doctrine of mental incapacity is that people
with mental disabilities need protecting, both from their own poor
judgment and from those who would exploit and take advantage of
them.197  The prevention of these harms is what justifies judicial in-
tervention.  One mechanism used by courts to protect people with
disabilities is the assessment of the transaction’s rationality.  Using
rationality as the test for the enforceability of the transaction is
problematic for two reasons:  first, behavioral economics challenges
the assumption that decision-making is rational; second, the auton-
omy of people with mental disabilities may be undermined by re-
quiring that their decisions be rational.
1. Policing Through Rationality
Poor judgment of the person with questionable capacity often
leads to judicial inquiry about the rationality and economic viability
of the contract.  Courts may broadly inquire into the transaction’s
rationality to substantiate the claim of incapacity.  The more holisti-
cally unfair the transaction, the more likely the person of questiona-
ble capacity did not have the legal capacity to enter the contract.  A
subset of these cases involves a specific inquiry into the economic
value of the exchange or the consideration supporting the contract.
If the exchange is grossly disproportionate, then this, among other
factors, is evidence that the person economically harmed did not
have the legal capacity to enter the contract.  Courts will invalidate
the transaction using the concept of gross inadequacy of considera-
tion.  Both the broad and the narrow approaches used by courts are
discussed herein.
196. Beyond Guardianship, supra note 18, at 76. See generally Clinton Luth,
The Color of Competency: The Differential Race Impact of Mental Health Assess-
ment in Voidable Contracts, 20 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 563 (2017) (discussing
the interaction between mental disabilities and the legal system, particularly the
impact of existing competency tests).
197. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 20; Brucken et al., supra, note 17, at 1025;
Green, Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency, 38 MICH. L.
REV. 1189, 1205–12 (1940).
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A number of courts have allowed rescission by a person with a
mental disability on the basis the underlying transaction is economi-
cally irrational from the perspective of the person with the disabil-
ity.  Courts have long measured mental incompetence by
considering the rationality of an action.198  Often the person seek-
ing avoidance and rescission offers the irrationality of the transac-
tion as evidence of the person’s mental incompetency.199  The
standard of review is whether “the particular transaction in its re-
sults is that which a reasonably competent man might have
made.”200  This standard is based in part on Section 15(1)(b) of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the comments thereto.
Prior to adoption of the Second Restatement, the legal defini-
tion of mental incapacity was solely a cognitive one:  the issue was
whether the person was able to understand and appreciate the con-
sequences of her actions and the nature of the transaction.  The
cognitive test for incapacity does not overtly require an inquiry into
the wisdom or economic rationality of the transaction.  Despite this,
many jurisdictions did consider this factor.201  This led one promi-
nent legal scholar to conclude that the economic fairness of the
transaction was not just a factor in the court’s analysis but was the
dispositive factor in determining the legal capacity of a contracting
party.202  The more irrational or morally repugnant the transaction
and the circumstances surrounding the contract’s formation, the
less evidence of incompetency is required by the court.203  Con-
198. See Meiklejohn, supra note 93, at 315–18; Green, Proof of Mental Incom-
petency, supra note 88, at 281–304, 309.
199. Professor Peter Margulies labels approach as the outcome test of capac-
ity.  Peter Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to
Representing Senior Citizens of Questionable Capacity, 62 FORDHAM. L. REV.
1073, 1982 (1994).
200. See Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency, supra note 88, at 309.
201. See Brucken et al., supra, note 17, at 1042 nn.117–18.
202. See Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency, supra note 88, at 275.  Green
argues that the fairness of the transaction is the only guiding principle that recon-
ciles the wildly inconsistent results in incompetency cases; see also CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 27.10 (REV. ED. 2001); WILLISTON, supra note  43, § 10.3; Maxine
Boord Virtue, Restitution from the Mentally Infirm, 26 N.Y.U. L. REV. 132, 151
(1951); Lawrence Frolik & Mary Radford, “Sufficient” Capacity: The Contrasting
Capacity Requirements for Different Documents, 2 NAELA J. 303, 318 n.89 (2006)
(citing Bach v. Hudson, 596 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)).  Others challenge
Green on this point, arguing that courts take a more global approach, with fairness
being relevant, but not determinative.  Meiklejohn, supra note 93, at 203.
203. See Oullette v. Ledoux, 30 A.2d 13, 16 (N.H. 1943); Schanck v. Hooper,
160 N.Y.S.627, 630 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916). But see Estate of McGovern v. Com-
monwealth, 517 A.2d 523 (Pa. 1986) at 526 (“. . . a presumption of mental incapac-
ity does not arise merely because of an unreasonable or unnatural disposition of
property.”).
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versely, if the court determines the deal is fair, the bar for proving
the mental incompetence of the contracting party is much higher.204
In 1981, the American Law Institute published the final version
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  Included in the Second
Restatement is Section 15(1)(b) which expands the definition of
mental incapacity to include both a volitional test and cognitive
test.205  Comments were added advising courts to consider the rea-
sonableness of the transaction when evaluating whether a person
satisfied the volitional test for mental incapacity.206  Many courts
accepted this overt invitation and continue either directly or indi-
rectly to assess the rationality of the actions of the party seeking
rescission when determining whether the person was mentally in-
competent.207 Slorby v. Johnson208 is instructive on this point.  This
case involved a conservator’s attempt to rescind a contract for a
deed transferring over 600 acres of farmland from one unrelated
neighbor to another.  The sale price of the land was $64,000, al-
though the land had a value of $240,000 at the time of transfer; the
contract provided for no down payment and had an interest rate
three percent less than the market rate.209  The court expressly
stated, “The low price and other favorable terms, while they may
not alone be indicative of a person’s mental capacity, could cer-
tainly be considered by the trial court as one of many factors in
deciding whether Steffons was competent to execute the contract
for deed.”210  The economic irrationality of the terms of the con-
tract is treated as evidence of the grantor’s incapacity.
The court in Hauer v. Union State Bank of Wautoma211
avoided a loan entered into by plaintiff based on incapacity even
204. See Margulies, supra note 199, at 1075 (“If the decisions appear ‘right,’
the individual possesses capacity.  If the decisions are ‘wrong,’ the individual lacks
capacity.”).  One commentator suggests that the courts’ assessment or evaluation
of the fairness of the transaction is the inevitable consequence of the use of the
concept of the “ability to understand” the nature of the transaction contained in
the definition of legal incompetency.  He argues that the only way to determine the
level of understanding of the person entering into the contract is to look at the
objective manifestation of that understanding; there is a way that we can look into
the mind of the person entering into the contract so all we are left with is the
manifestation of that person’s mind. See Weihofen, supra note 44, at 217.
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 15(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
206. Id. § 15 cmt. b, c.
207. See Sparrow v. Demonico, 960 N.E.2d 296, 303 (Mass. 2012); Farnum v.
Silvano 540 N.E.2d 202, 204 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
208. Slorby v. Johnson, 530 N.W.2d 307, 310 (N.D. 1995).
209. Id. at 308.
210. Id. at 313; see also Buchanan v. Prall, 167 N.W. 488, 489 (N.D. 1918).
211. Hauer v. Union State Bank of Wautoma, 532 N.W.2d 456, 466 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1995).
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though the plaintiff could not restore the proceeds of the loan.  The
court noted the plaintiff suffered a brain injury in a motorcycle acci-
dent and that her monthly income after the accident was $900,
which consisted of social security disability and income from a mu-
tual fund.212  Because she needed the funds to survive, it was eco-
nomically unreasonable to use this money as collateral for a loan, of
which she was not the direct beneficiary.213  The court allowed the
avoidance and rescission of the loan based on mental incapacity,
implicitly relying on the economic irrationality of the transaction to
support the claim.
The relationship between the parties is an additional measure
of the transaction’s rationality.214  Courts consider factors such as
the social context within which the transaction occurred, including
the relationship between the impaired party, the party challenging
the transaction, and the non-impaired party to the transaction.  The
court in Slorby may have been willing to rescind the deed because
the grantees were not related to the grantor and did not care for
him in any significant manner.215  The court’s decision to avoid the
loan in Hauer was influenced by the fact the borrower did not use
the loan proceeds.  Rather, the proceeds were used by someone un-
related to her—an individual the court portrayed as having taken
advantage of her.216
The court is more likely to deem the transfer rational if there is
a familial relationship or friendship between the two parties.217  In
Butler v. Harrison,218 the beneficiaries of a wife’s will challenged
the quitclaim deed she signed; the deed transferred certain real
property to herself and to her husband as tenants by the entirety.
The beneficiaries alleged that the wife was mentally incompetent at
the time of signing.  In upholding the transaction, the court noted,
212. Id. at 459.
213. Id.
214. See Virtue, supra note 202, at 151.  Virtue stated,
that if it was a reasonable contract and the recipient was a worthy object
of trust and faith, then that shows sufficient capacity to uphold the con-
tract; but if support was not given . . . then the grantor was incapacitated
because no-one in his right mind would have made such a contract.
Id.
215. Slorby v. Johnson, 530 N.W.2d 307, 308 (N.D. 1995) (“Peter’s [grantee]
contacts with Steffens [grantor] were limited to occasional visits at the Willard
Johns Sr. home and one or two visits with Steffens while he resided in Minot with
Olson.”).
216. See Hauer, 532 N.W.2d at 466.
217. See Meikeljohn, supra note 93, at 361–67 (arguing that the social context
within which the transactions occurred is highly relevant to court decisions as to
avoidance and rescission).
218. Butler v. Harrison, 578 A.2d 1098, 1098–99 (D.C. 1990).
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“[N]othing in the record suggest[s] that Mrs. Harrison’s action in
executing the April 8, 1992[ ] deed was a bizarre conveyance.”219
That a wife was transferring property to her spouse, and not an un-
related person, may have influenced the court’s decision to uphold
the conveyance as reasonable.220
In Citizens State Bank v. Ruebel,221 the owner of property, who
had signed a mortgage to secure a loan for her daughter and son-in-
law, sought to invalidate a mortgage based on mental incapacity.
The appellate court remanded, requiring the trial court to hold a
hearing on the issue of the landowner’s competency.  The appellate
court noted that “it is difficult to look at this transaction and con-
clude that Citizens operated in good faith.  Elsie was a vulnerable
older Iowan whose only child was in the process of taking financial
advantage of her.  There is no evidence Elsie gained any financial
advantage from the transaction.”222  Here, the court was influenced
not only by the landowner’s irrational economic decision but also
by the fact that an ungrateful and greedy family member exploited
her mother.  This added to the overall substantive unfairness of the
transaction.
The court in Farnum v. Silvano223 voided the sale of real prop-
erty when it found the seller incompetent.  The court noted that the
seller, who at the time of sale was ninety years old, had medical and
other expenses she was required to pay.  Thus, “it was not rational
to part with a major asset for a cut-rate price.”224  The court addi-
tionally was influenced by the fact that the buyer-grantee was unre-
lated to the seller and had not cared for her for a lengthy period.
Testimony revealed that this young man in his early twenties knew
the seller because he performed yard work for her.  This factor en-
hanced the apparent irrationality of the transfer.
Not all courts consider the transaction’s rationality when as-
sessing the mental incompetence of the person seeking to avoid the
contract.  In Estate of McGovern,225 the court expressly declined to
follow Restatement (Second) Section 15(1)(b) and the attendant
comments.  At issue was the decedent’s mental competency at the
time he made the challenged retirement selection.  The petitioner-
son argued, in part, that the irrationality of the option chosen evi-
219. Id. at 1101.
220. See Kirk v. Tackett, 279 N.W. 468, 470 (Neb. 1938).
221. Citizens State Bank v. Ruebel, No. 10-1028, 2011 WL 3116243, at *1
(Iowa Ct. App. July 27, 2011).
222. Id. at *4.
223. Farnum v. Silvano, 540 N.E.2d 202, 203 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
224. Id. at 205.
225. Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 517 A.2d 523, 524 (Pa. 1986).
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denced the decedent’s mental incompetence.  The court refused to
consider the economic rationality of the disposition when determin-
ing if the decedent was mentally competent.226
In Matter of Estate of Obermeier,227 the niece of the decedent
challenged the sale of real property to the decedent’s neighbor
based on the aunt’s mental incompetency.  The majority upheld the
transaction without discussing the economic rationality of the trans-
action or considering the decedent’s relationship with the grantee,
an unrelated neighbor, or with the petitioner, the decedent’s niece.
The dissent doubted the viability of the transaction by pointing to
various pieces evidence.  The sale price was less than half the ap-
praised value of the property, the evidence concerning the mental
incompetency of the grantor was compelling, and there were seri-
ous inconsistencies in grantee’s testimony concerning his relation-
ship with the decedent and the impetus for the transaction.228  The
majority failed to address any of the dissenters’ objections.  Despite
the refusal of some courts to assess a transaction’s rationality, the
majority heed the recommendations reflected in the Restatement
by using this as a factor to determine whether the claimant was ca-
pable of entering into the contract.
A second way courts seek to protect people with mental disa-
bilities from irrational transactions is by invoking the concept of
gross inadequacy of consideration.  Generally, contract law is pri-
vate law, and the role of the state via the judiciary is limited to
ensuring the formalities of the law have been satisfied.  Tradition-
ally, the judicial role in policing the substance of the agreement was
very limited.  A corollary to this limited scope of review is that
courts will not invalidate a contract simply because what the parties
exchange is not of equivalent economic value.229  According to
traditional contract principles, courts will not weigh
consideration.230
Despite the strong policy against the judicial economic policing
of agreements, courts regularly undermine this doctrine when a
226. Id. at 527; see also Bailey v. Bailey, 677 S.E.2d 56, 59 (2009) (citing
Drewry v. Drewry, 383 S.E.2d 12, 15 (Va. Ct. App. 1989)).
227. In re Estate of Obermeier, 150 A.D.2d 863, 863–64 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989).
228. Id. at 865.
229. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
1981); see also 3 Williston on Contracts § 7:21 (4th ed. 1990).
230. See Alpha Capital Anstalt v. Real Goods Solar, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 3d 623,
631 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); CD Int’l Enter., Inc. v. Rockwell Capital Partners, Inc., 251 F.
Supp. 3d 39, 45 (D.C. 2017); Peyton v. Peyton, 271 S.W.2d 493, 500 (Tex. Civ. App.
1954); Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
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contracting party is of questionable capacity.231  Courts invoke
gross inadequacy of consideration to justify avoiding a contract
based on mental incapacity.232  Although not dispositive, evidence
that a party entered into a contract that is extremely disadvanta-
geous to her persuasively suggests incapacity.233
The use of evidence of gross inadequacy of consideration is not
limited to establishing the incompetency of the contracting party.
This evidence also may serve as a factor that, when combined with
mental weakness, provides a basis for the invalidation of a transac-
tion.  The court in Gilliland v. Carpenter234 invalidated two deeds,
arguing “this case presents a situation where the inadequacy of con-
sideration is coupled with evidence of failing mental capacity of the
grantor.”235  This coupling provided the basis for invalidating the
deeds.  There was evidence the value of the land was $51,000 on the
date the parties signed the deeds, a value much greater than the
$5,000 purchase price.236  But the Gilliland court did not find the
grantor legally incompetent.237  Indeed, the court conceded there
was insufficient evidence to invalidate the deeds based solely on the
grantor’s mental incapacity.  Despite this, and despite the general
rule that courts should not weigh consideration, the court invali-
dated the deeds.
Gilliland is not an outlier.  Other courts couple mental weak-
ness short of incapacity with gross inadequacy of consideration to
invalidate transactions.238  These decisions do not always refer
overtly to the irrationality of the transaction.  However, by defini-
tion, when courts invoke the concept of gross inadequacy of consid-
eration, the decisions infer that the exchange is economically
irrational because the values are economically disparate.  When in-
231. See In re Estate of Green, 755 So. 2d 1054, 1055 (Miss. 2000); Slaick v.
Arnold, 728 S.E.2d 782, 785 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).  Note that evidence of weakness
of intellect not rising to the level of legal mental incapacity may not be enough to
justify avoidance or rescission even if there is inadequacy of consideration.
232. See Williamson v. Matthews, 379 So. 2d 1245, 1247 (Ala. 1980); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1981); 26A C.J.S.
Deeds § 103 (2019).
233. See Campbell v. Lux, 225 S.W. 653, 654 (Ark. 1920); Black v. Duffie, 508
S.W.3d 40, 43 (Ark. Ct. App. 2016).
234. See Gilliland v. Carpenter, 395 S.E.2d 779, 780 (W. Va. 1990).
235. Id. at 783; see also Bryant v. Bryant, 379 So. 2d 382, 383 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979).
236. Gilliland, 395 S.E.2d at 783.
237. Id.
238. See Allore v. Jewell, 94 U.S. 506, 510 (1876); Sheppard v. Clay Peacock
Coal Co., 285 S.E.2d 902, 905 (W. Va. 1982); Dohrmann v. Swaney, 14 N.E.3d 605,
615 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); Daughton v. Parson, 423 N.W.2d 894, 896 (Iowa Ct. App.
1988) (citing to Brewster v. Brewster, 188 N.W. 672, 674 (Iowa 1922)).
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validating these transactions, the court seeks to protect the assets of
the person with a disability either for herself or for her beneficiaries
and family members.
2. Behavioral Law and Economics—Decision Making Is
Irrational
Whatever strategy courts employ to allow them to consider the
rationality of the transaction, the question remains whether this
should be a factor at all.239  The emphasis on rationality fails to con-
sider the increasing evidence offered by behavioral economics that
neurotypical people make irrational, poor decisions all the time.  To
invalidate only the irrational transactions of those with questiona-
ble capacity creates a double standard.240
The mental incapacity doctrine restricts the ability of a person
with a mental disability to enter into economically irrational con-
tracts.  Courts implicitly or explicitly using this standard assume
that contracts should be enforced against people with a mental disa-
bility only if the contracts are economically reasonable.241  This
doctrine empowers courts to police these contracts in a way they
may not for those without mental disabilities.  Intervention on be-
half of people with mental disabilities is questionable because it as-
sumes that people without mental disabilities make rational
decisions.  However, research by behavioral economists challenges
this fundamental assumption of rationality.242
239. For a critique of the application of the reasonable man standard in law of
torts to cases involving the disabled see tenBroek, supra note 16, at 912–18.  For a
discussion supporting rationality see Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Reasons, 10 J. CON-
TEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 189 (1999).
240. See Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997
U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 394 (1997) (arguing that current capacity law unjustifiably
holds people who are mentally retarded to a higher capacity standard than those
who are not similarly impaired).
241. The court in Estate of McGovern expressly rejected the concept that irra-
tionality of a decision proves incompetence and thus justifies intervention by the
court:
Thus, the claim that is made here in the name of incompetence is in real-
ity a challenge to the wisdom, the desirability, the thoughtfulness and the
rationality of the disposition.  But such a challenge may not succeed, for
neither courts nor disappointed heirs may alter the disposition of the
property of a deceased person merely on the grounds that that person
acted in a way that the challenger believes to be irrational.
Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 517 A.2d 523, 528 (Pa. 1986).
242. See Joshua D. Wright, Behavioral Law and Economics, Paternalism, and
Consumer Contracts: An Empirical Perspective, 2 N.Y.U.J.L. & LIBERTY 470, 471
(2007); see also Susan Block-Lieb & Edward Janger, The Myth of the Rational
Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy
Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1531 (2006).
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Behavioral economic theory challenges using the rationality of
the transaction as a basis for assessing incapacity and the enforce-
ability of the contract.243  Courts that evaluate the capacity of a per-
son based on the rationality of the transaction are harkening back
to a fundamental concept that underlies Anglo-American law:  that
of the reasonable man.244  This concept permeates all areas of the
law, including criminal law, torts, and, of course, contract law.  Con-
tract law generally, and the mental incapacity doctrine specifically,
have embraced this norm.245  This is reflected in the decisions dis-
cussed above as well as the Restatement (Second) of Contracts Sec-
tion 15.  The law assumes that parties to contracts are rational
actors, that they have perfect information, and that they can accu-
rately analyze that information before making a decision.246  Legal
accountability for one’s actions often rests on the question of
whether those actions were the product of rational thought
processes.  Under many legal doctrines, the more intentional the
actions of the person, the more legal liability is imposed.  Thus, the
243. Behavioral economist Alain Samson summarizes the basic tenets of be-
havioral economics:
• People are not always self-interested, benefits maximizing, and costs mini-
mizing individuals with stable preferences
• Most choices made by people are not the result of careful deliberation
• Choices are influenced by insufficient knowledge, feedback, and processing
capability
• People are influenced by readily available information
• People live in the moment, resist change, and are subject to distorted
memory
• People are social animals with social preferences and are susceptible to social
norms
See generally Alain Samson, An Introduction to Behavioral Economics, in THE BE-
HAVIORAL ECONOMICS GUIDE, 1 (1st ed. 2014).  Samson’s Introduction is pre-
mised on the groundbreaking work of psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky, and economist Richard Thaler.
244. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Behavioral Economics and Contract Law, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 438, 443
(Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 1st ed. 2014).  I purposely use the reasonable
“man,” not reasonable “person,” as when the concept originated, women were not
universally considered to have legal capacity.
245. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, 20–22.
246. See Eisenberg, supra note 244, at 439.
Rationality, for this purpose, requires that an actor possesses and accu-
rately processes all readily available information concerning the out-
comes of alternative choices, ranks the possible outcomes in order of
their expected utility, understands probability, and properly discounts fu-
ture states of the world when comparing them with present states of the
world.
Id.; see also Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 242, at 1526 (explaining rational
choice theory presumes that individuals possess the intellectual capacity to identify
their preferences, to maximize their utility when possible, and to act rationally
under conditions of uncertainty when necessary).
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law inquires whether the person subject to legal liability acted negli-
gently, recklessly, or intentionally.247  In measuring each of these,
courts traditionally ask what a reasonable man would have done
under similar circumstances.  The following excerpt conveys, some-
what ironically, the essence of the reasonable man:
He is one who invariably looks where he is going, and is careful
to examine the immediate foreground before he executes a leap
or a bound; . . . who believes no gossip, nor repeats it, without
firm basis for believing it to be true; . . . who in the way of busi-
ness looks only for that narrow margin of profit which twelve
men such as himself would reckon to be ‘fair’. . .; who uses noth-
ing except in moderation, and . . . is meditating only on the
golden mean.  Devoid, in short, of any human weakness, with not
one single saving vice, sans prejudice, procrastination, ill-nature,
avarice, and absence of mind . . . this excellent but odious charac-
ter stands like a monument in our Courts of Justice, vainly ap-
pealing to his fellow-citizens to order their lives after his own
example.248
While this excerpt is sardonic, the truth remains that the reasonable
man (now the reasonable person) continues to haunt legal doctrine.
The theory of law and economics embraces and reifies the rea-
sonable person.  A basic tenet of law and economics is the rational
choice theory, developed by economists in the 1950s.249  The ra-
tional choice theory presumes individuals possess the intellectual
capacity to identify their preferences, to maximize their utility when
possible, and to act rationally under conditions of uncertainty
whenever necessary.250  In economics, the standard approach as-
sumes “full rationality.”251  Full rationality includes the following
basic components:  1) people have well-defined preferences (or
goals) and make decisions to maximize those preferences; 2) those
preferences accurately reflect (to the best of the person’s knowl-
edge) the true costs and benefits of the available options; and 3) in
situations that involve uncertainty, people have well-formed beliefs
about how uncertainty will resolve itself, and when new information
247. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 18, at 74.
248. A.P. HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 14–16 (4th ed.
1930).
249. See Thomas S. Ulen, The Importance of Behavioral Law, in The Oxford
Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law 93 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teich-
man eds., 2014); see also Eisenberg, supra note 244, at 442.
250. Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 242, at 1526.
251. Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Econom-
ics and The Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1214
(2003).
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becomes available, they update their beliefs.252  Economic theory
posits that, normatively and descriptively, the law should be gov-
erned by rationality and should assume the reasonable person stan-
dard applies.
Behavioral economists and psychologists argue that rational
choice theory does not sufficiently explain human behavior.253
Modern legal scholars frequently and increasingly base their analy-
ses not on the neoclassical economics assumption of rationality but
on the assumption individuals are subject to a number of systematic
behavioral biases, such as bounded rationality, errors in judgment,
and non-standard preferences.254  The concept of bounded rational-
ity posits that actors rarely make fully informed decisions.255  In-
stead, human rationality is normally bounded by limited
information and limited information-processing ability.256  Pursuant
to this theory, even individuals whose mental capacity is not called
into question may be neurologically unable to process information
needed to weigh the costs and benefits of a particular choice, thus
leading to an irrational decision.  Actors often lack the ability to
process information perfectly257 because of neuropsychological lim-
its of the brain and definitional limits inherent in language.258  Cog-
nitive experiments show that individuals adopt timesaving
strategies to simplify complex decision-making; however, some-
times this results in biased decision making.259
Behavioral psychology also contends that defects in disposition
and in capability may lead to irrational decision making.  Actors
may have a defect in their disposition because they are unrealisti-
252. Id. at 1214–15; see also Botond Koszegi, Behavioral Contract Theory, J.
ECON. LITERATURE, Dec. 2014, at 1075, 1085 (describing the Quasi-Bayesian ap-
proach to be where an actor updates her beliefs consistent with Bayes’s law but
commits a particular error that is inconsistent with rational inference).
253. See Ulen, supra note 249, at 93, 96 (explaining that behavioral experi-
ments suggest human beings do not behave as rational choice theory predicts and
that they do not typically make decisions that enhance their welfare as much as
they might).
254. Wright, supra note 242, at 471 (“Although some scholars have chal-
lenged this empirical literature, they have not generally denied the existence of
cognitive biases, or the possibility that behavioral models might have greater pre-
dictive power” of an actor’s behavior); see Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law and
Economics: A Progress Report, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115, 121 (1999) (“The
notion of ‘quasi-rationality’ should be taken to suggest departures from standard
economic assumptions, but departures that are systematic and predictable, and
thus a legitimate basis for predicting human behavior.”).
255. See Eisenberg, supra note 244, at 443.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 242, at 1531.
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cally optimistic.260  An actor may have a defect in capability if she is
unable to make rational comparisons between the present and fu-
ture—also referred to as the “faulty telescope faculty.”261  Myopia
can explain an actor’s impulsive behavior or inability to act ration-
ally.262  Capability defect also may manifest in the form of system-
atic underestimation of risk when actors are unable to or choose to
ignore the possibility of future risks.263
Behavioral economic theory can be applied to any number of
cases involving mental incapacity.  The defect in disposition that re-
sults in unrealistic optimism can explain the choice made by the
decedent in Ortelere.264  The decedent, Mrs. Ortelere, changed her
retirement benefits so that upon her death, her spouse would not
receive any remaining benefits.  Mrs. Ortelere’s spouse successfully
challenged the election based on Mrs. Ortelere’s mental incapacity,
arguing her selection was irrational.  However, this choice can be
explained as her being unrealistically optimistic about her longev-
ity.  She made this decision assuming she would live long enough to
enjoy the benefits of her retirement.  While the court took this as
evidence of lack of mental capacity, behavioral economic theory
provides an alternative explanation.  The decision made by Mrs.
Ortelere is a decision that could have been made by anyone, re-
gardless of mental capacity.  The irrationality of this decision might
not have been a sufficient basis for avoiding her election.
The inability to make rational comparisons between the pre-
sent and the future can also explain decisions made by those whose
capacity is questionable.  People who have transferred assets de-
spite the evident need for those assets for their future care may
simply be exhibiting a defect in capability.  For instance, the trans-
260. See id. at 1540–41 (showing consumers have difficulty assessing the likeli-
hood that they will lose their job, get sick, get a divorce, have a child; this is also
known as overconfidence bias); Sunstein, supra note 254 at 136–37.
261. Eisenberg, supra note 244, at 447 (explaining that actors tend to “give
too little weight to future benefits and costs as compared to present benefits and
costs”); Oren Bar-Gill, Consumer Transactions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465, 474 (describing that myopic consum-
ers care too much about the present and not enough about the future; consumers
tend to underestimate the probability of triggering the contingent, future costs);
Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 242 at 1543–44 (explaining that the impulse for
immediate gratification is often irresistible in spite of any long-term consequence,
i.e., individuals are more likely to finance purchases than wait until they can pay in
full).
262. See Sunstein, supra note 254, at 122.
263. See Eisenberg, supra note 244, at 447 (citing cognitive psychologist Ken-
neth Arrow’s observation that there is a tendency to underestimate uncertainties).
264. Ortelere v. Teachers’ Ret. Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460, 466 (N.Y. 1969).
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fer by the grantor in Farnum,265 in which the ninety-year-old gran-
tor deeded her house to her twenty-five-year-old gardener, can be
explained by behavioral economic theory.  The court noted the
transaction was irrational, as the grantor needed the asset to pay for
her living and medical expenses.  However, this decision can be ex-
plained by the grantor’s inability to anticipate accurately the future
and her need to have the asset available for her support.  Her in-
ability to assess risk accurately is not evidence of mental incapacity.
Rather, it is a reflection of her humanity.
If behavioral economists are right and we all make less than
optimal economic decisions, why distinguish those with mental disa-
bilities?  Unimpaired people who make economically poor contrac-
tual decisions are bound to those decisions.  The same is not true
for those with mental disabilities.  If both the impaired and the
unimpaired make irrational decisions not governed by benefit max-
imization, then the underlying justification for the mental incapac-
ity doctrine must be called into question.266  The reasonable man
turns out to be nothing more than a myth; some might say good
riddance!  As a result, the law binds unimpaired people to irrational
contracts but excuses the mentally impaired from such contracts.
Disability advocates argue that people with mental disabilities
should be allowed to make poor, even economically irrational deci-
sions just as the unimpaired do.267  Protection from making mis-
takes reduces the self-determination and thus the humanity of those
with mental disabilities.  Based on this concept, judicial interven-
tion allowing the people with a mental disability to avoid their con-
tractual liability is patronizing and, to a degree, dehumanizing.268
3. Rationality, Autonomy, and the Dignity of Risk
When courts use the mental incapacity doctrine to question the
rationality of the transaction, they do so in the name of protecting
265. Farnum v. Silvano, 540 N.E.2d 202, 203 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
266. A counter argument that deserves exploring in a follow-up essay is the
question of whether the ability, or inability, to correct for bias justifies the contin-
ued need for the incapacity doctrine.  Neurotypical people may be able to correct
for cognitive error once they become aware of the error or their own biases.  To
the extent that this is not true for people with certain kinds of mental disability, the
protection of the doctrine may be justified.
267. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 18, at 82.
268. A weakness of the dignity of risk argument in this context is that often
we want people to make mistakes so that they can learn from them and then subse-
quently make better choices.  Query whether this makes sense in the context of a
person with a permanent mental disability whose disability does not allow for this
increased decision-making ability.
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the person with a mental disability.269  When a person with a mental
disability makes a decision that reduces their financial resources,
courts consistently determine such a decision is irrational and sub-
ject to reversal.  “Protection” thus translates to the preservation of
these assets and resources.270  The person with the disability may
need these resources for their care, or these resources may be assets
in which the person’s relatives, beneficiaries, or heirs have a poten-
tial financial interest.271  As one author notes, “[a]n appreciable
number of cases brought by the nominal representative of the in-
competent involve fact situations in which the representative’s posi-
tion is not identified with the welfare or immediate legal interests of
the incompetent.”272  When a court polices agreements entered into
by someone with mental disabilities, the person’s assets may be
redistributed in ways that are inconsistent with that person’s
wishes.273  This violates the autonomy of the person with a mental
disability.274  The DRM has challenged legal actions that impinge
269. A study conducted of people confined to a mental institution challenges
the notion that people with mental disabilities do not or cannot make rational
decisions.  The study compared the responses of the mental patients with those of
the employees of the facility to questions about contemporary social and political
issues.  The study authors concluded, “[T]he results do not suggest that the mental
patients in our sample are more illogical, inconsistent, or unprepared to fulfill their
obligations as citizens than a similar group of individuals who are not identified as
emotionally unstable.”  Marguerite R. Hertz et al., Mental Patients and Civil
Rights: A Study of Opinions of Mental Patients on Social and Political Issues, 1 J.
HEALTH & HUM. BEHAV. 251, 258 (1960).
270. See, e.g., Weaver v. Carothers, 153 So. 201, 202 (1934).
271. One author conducted a study of over 800 mental incapacity cases.  Of
the cases in which the contracts were enforced (which was about one-half of the
total 800 cases), fewer than one-fourth involved the parties to the contract.  Guard-
ians, heirs, executors, or administrators brought the others.  Of the contracts that
were avoided, about one-eighth of the cases were between the immediate parties.
Guardians, heirs, executors, administrators, or nexts-of friend brought the remain-
der.  Virtue, supra note 202, at 149–50.
272. Id. at 150.
273. Id. at 142 (“Avoiding the contract and protecting the lunatic, therefore,
are not necessarily equivalent.”).
274. The concept of autonomy and its relevance to people with disabilities,
particularly intellectual or mental disabilities, is a contested one within the disabil-
ity studies and Disability Rights Movement.  This essay does not engage in this
debate but provides this short synopsis:  at issue is whether the liberal political
concept of autonomy results in the exclusion of people with disabilities from the
political and economic life of a society.  This has led scholars and activists to chal-
lenge the definition, to give the concept an alternate reading, and to reject the
concept entirely as a goal of the Disability Rights Movement.  A sampling of this
debate can be found in the following sources: see generally CAREY, supra note 163;
Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Au-
tonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13 (2000); EVA
FEDER KITTAY, LOVE’S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY AND DEPEN-
DENCY (1999); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EX-
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upon the personal autonomy of people with mental disabilities, as
well as the actions and restrictions placed on people with mental
disabilities for the sake of protecting them.275  The ADA, in its sec-
tion identifying the statute’s purpose, expressly provides that “indi-
viduals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of
discrimination, including . . . overprotective rules and policies.”276
Invalidating a transaction because it is economically irrational
shields the person with a mental disability from the negative finan-
cial consequences of her actions.  Increasingly, however, disability
activists are resisting this insulation from liability.  The “dignity of
risk” principle captures this resistance to shield people with disabili-
ties from the consequences of poor decisions.  This concept was ar-
ticulated by Robert Perske277 and embraced by others disability
advocates.278  Pursuant to the dignity of risk, those who are cogni-
tively or neurologically impaired are entitled to experience life as
others do, including assuming a certain amount of risk.  Perske and
his adherents argue the goal should not be to protect people with
mental disabilities.  Rather, people with mental disabilities should
be equipped with the tools to manage risk and the failures that may
follow.279  Human dignity demands preparation, not protection.
Human development requires not only the right to make choices
but the ability to assume personal responsibility for those choices
regardless of failure or even physical harm.280
Overt appeal of the autonomous decision making of people
with mental disabilities is rare in cases outside of the guardianship
context.  In one case, a court articulated concern about the threat
CLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF
JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006).
275. See generally BAGENSTOS, supra note 142; BERKOWITZ, DISABLED POL-
ICY: AMERICA’S PROGRAMS FOR THE HANDICAPPED (1987); CHARLTON, supra
note 38; AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW
FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers,
eds., 2000); ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEO-
PLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES (1996); SHAPIRO, supra note 155; STEPHEN M.
SHORE, BEYOND THE WALL: PERSONAL EXPERIENCES WITH AUTISM AND AS-
PERGER SYNDROME (2d ed. 2003).
276. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2017).
277. Robert Perske, The Dignity of Risk and the Mentally Retarded, 10
MENTAL RETARDATION 24, 26 (1972).
278. BAGENSTOS, supra note 142, at 90–94; Gerben DeJong, Defining and Im-
plementing the Independent Living Concept, in INDEPENDENT LIVING FOR PHYSI-
CALLY DISABLED PEOPLE, supra note 179, at 4, 20; NAT’L COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY, supra note 18, at 47; Irving Kenneth Zola, Toward Independent Liv-
ing: Goals and Dilemmas, in INDEPENDENT LIVING FOR PHYSICALLY DISABLED
PEOPLE, supra note 179, at 344, 351–53.
279. See Perske, supra note 277, at 26.
280. BAGENSTOS, supra note 142, at 77–94; Zola, supra note 278, at 351–53.
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the incapacity doctrine posed to autonomy.  The court in Bell v.
Smith281 expressed this concern by upholding a contract entered
into by a father and challenged by his adult son:  “[i]t would be very
serious if the law should say that whenever the faculties of a man
began to fail because of his age it should be reason sufficient for
taking from him the right to control his property.”282  The court was
concerned about disempowering the father due to the natural de-
crease in mental acuity that sometimes accompanies aging.  Pursu-
ant to the dignity of risk, the father was entitled to dispose of his
property as he saw fit, even if his decision was economically irra-
tional from the perspective of his child and even if it put the father’s
assets at risk.
Returning to Renchard, the plaintiff may have made an eco-
nomically foolish decision to liquidate his trust fund and spend $1.4
million on a yacht.  In that case, the court refused to grant the de-
fendant-seller’s motion to dismiss and found that there were mate-
rial facts at issue concerning the plaintiff’s capacity to enter into
contracts.  It is possible the court attempted to use the mental inca-
pacity doctrine to protect the plaintiff from an economically poor
decision.  However, the dignity of risk principle would challenge
this action, upholding the plaintiff’s right to make this poor decision
even if it left the plaintiff economically worse off.
By insisting on protecting people with mental disabilities
through the mental incapacity doctrine, courts undermine the au-
tonomy of people with mental disabilities.  This may be easier to
justify when the person has been adjudicated incompetent, but ab-
sent that determination, the interference may be unwarranted.283
By intervening via the mental incapacity doctrine, courts expand
the circle of protection while simultaneously restricting the auton-
omy and dignity of the person with the disability.
E. Consequences
The plaintiff in the Renchard hypothetical I posed at the begin-
ning of this essay attempted to avoid his contractual liability by ar-
guing he did not have the requisite mental capacity to enter into the
disputed contracts.  Under the proposed limitation to the doctrine,
the plaintiff would be unable to raise the mental incapacity doc-
281. Bell v. Smith, 32 N.Y.S. 54 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1894), cited with approval in
In re Gebauer’s Estate, 361 N.Y.S.2d 539, 552 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1974).
282. Bell, 32 N.Y.S. at 56.
283. For a discussion of this tension between autonomy and protection in the
context of elderly people with questionable capacity, see Rein, supra note 18, at
1164–68.
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trine, as he had not been adjudicated mentally incompetent.  In-
deed, under my proposed revision, the doctrine could not be raised
in most of the cases considered in this essay.  The revision creates a
bright line between those who have been adjudicated incompetent
and are thus subject to plenary guardianship and those who have
not and are not.  This section addresses some qualms about the pro-
posal without necessarily resolving them.  These are additional
questions to consider as we contemplate the evolving relationship
between contracts and people with mental disabilities.
First, will my proposal, in fact, alleviate the anxiety a seller/
lender might experience when dealing with a customer with a
mental disability?  A bright line test could help if, during contract
negotiations, the Title III seller/lender could tactfully elicit from the
potential customer whether they are currently subject to a guardi-
anship, either plenary or limited.  If limited, the follow-up question
could be whether the customer retained the authority to enter into
this particular type of transaction.  Actual knowledge that the po-
tential customer was not subject to a guardianship would remove
incapacity as a disincentive to engage in the transaction, which
would be a desirable result.
Additionally, and of critical importance for the purposes of this
essay, it is unlikely that refusing to enter into a transaction with a
person subject to plenary guardianship would violate Title III of the
ADA.  The ADA’s definition of discrimination includes the imposi-
tion of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an
individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabili-
ties.284  On its face, screening out those people with disabilities who
are subject to a guardianship would constitute discrimination under
this section of the ADA.  However, the section provides an excep-
tion that such criteria are permissible when they are “necessary for
the provision of the goods[ or] services . . . being offered.”285  A
business subject to Title III could make a plausible argument that
refusing to contract with a person adjudicated incompetent fits
within the exception provided by the statute.  Thus, my proposal
could act as a safe harbor for entities subject to Title III of the
ADA, reducing uncertainty and conflict and thus promoting con-
tractual relationships with people with mental disabilities not sub-
ject to plenary guardianships.
Entities subject to Title III of the ADA would exercise more
care when contracting with people with mental disabilities who are
284. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (2017).
285. Id.
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subject to a limited guardianship.  Limited guardianships grant peo-
ple with mental disabilities decision-making capacity over some as-
pects of their lives.  People with mental disabilities subject to
limited guardianships are able to enter into certain contracts, and a
covered entity would violate Title III if, based on the disability, it
failed to enter into a contract with them.  An appealing aspect of
my proposal is that it is consistent with the underlying goals of lim-
ited guardianship laws.  The person with the mental disability would
be accountable for all contracts entered into in the categories left
untouched by the guardianship.  Thus, if the court mandates that a
person with a mental disability have control over housing, any con-
tract the person enters into regarding housing would not be subject
to attack based on the incapacity doctrine.  This seems consistent
with the goal of a limited guardianship which is to empower the
person with the mental disability.  This also is consistent with dig-
nity of risk which empowers the person with a mental disability to
make decisions even if those decisions have negative
consequences.286
A further concern is whether the revised rule could incentivize
representatives to seek plenary guardianship instead of limited
guardianship for a person with a mental disability.  This is a serious
risk, as disability rights activists, scholars, and legislators have justi-
fiably attacked plenary guardianships for many years.287  However,
the proposed restriction would require the person seeking to avoid
the contract be adjudicated incompetent before the person entered
into the contract, not thereafter.  Subjecting a person to a guardian-
ship after the contract would not allow the person retroactively to
use the mental incapacity doctrine to challenge the contract.  This
proposed change might disincentivize the establishment of a guardi-
anship, as it becomes irrelevant to the enforceability of the contract.
286. The bright line test I propose does not address the serious challenges
presented by guardianship.  Economic rationality and the use of stereotype are
used in assessing competence in guardianship proceedings; this essay does not ad-
dress the appropriateness of using these factors in guardianship proceedings.
However, the arguments I have made herein could certainly be applied to guardi-
anship proceedings.  While acknowledging that this is the case, I have chosen not
to explore that issue here.
287. For articles exploring critiques of plenary guardianship, see Lawrence A.
Frolik, Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, A Critique and A Proposal for Reform,
23 ARIZ. L. REV. 599 (1981); Nancy J. Knauer, Defining Capacity: Balancing the
Competing Interests of Autonomy and Need, 12 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 321
(2003); Roger Sherman, Guardianship: Time for a Reassessment, 49 FORDHAM L.
REV. 350 (1981); Jan Ellen Rein, Preserving Dignity and Self-Determination of the
Elderly in the Face of Competing Interests and Grim Alternatives: A Proposal for
Statutory Refocus and Reform, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1818 (1992).
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Currently, the post-contract adjudication of incompetency can be
offered as evidence that the person was mentally incompetent when
they entered into the contract.  My proposed change would render
this evidence irrelevant.
I also have concerns about the socio-economic impact of the
proposal.  To take advantage of the incapacity doctrine, someone in
the orbit of the person with a mental disability would be required to
establish either a guardianship or a conservatorship.  The process of
establishing a guardianship is expensive, and navigating the process
takes a certain amount of acumen and access to non-financial re-
sources.288  Courts assess fees to file the petition.  If an attorney
prepares and files the petition, the person seeking to establish the
guardianship will incur attorney fees.  The court will establish a
guardianship when it determines that the person with a mental disa-
bility is mentally incompetent.  Establishing incompetency requires
examination and assessment by health care professionals, such as
physicians, who charge for their services.  Generally, counsel, who
charges for assistance, must represent the person with the mental
disability.289  Further, if the court establishes a guardianship, there
are ongoing expenses related to the management of the affairs of
the ward.
Given the costs associated with this process, there is a risk that
my proposal would allow only those who could afford to establish a
guardianship to use the incapacity doctrine.  Consequently, those
unable to afford the guardianship process but who would benefit
from the protection offered by the mental incapacity doctrine
would be priced out of its protection.  It is difficult to measure the
impact the elimination of the mental incapacity doctrine would
have on those unable to afford the guardianship process.  Accessing
the legal system is financially burdensome already.  Even without
my proposed restriction, those challenging contracts based on
mental incapacity typically do so if there are assets at issue and if
they can hire counsel.
Additionally, many of the costs incurred when establishing a
guardianship would be incurred in an incapacity suit.  A complain-
ant seeking to invalidate a contract based on incapacity would incur
288. For a summary of the costs that can be incurred in establishing and main-
taining a guardianship or conservatorship, see Julie Garber, How Much Does
Guardianship or Conservatorship Cost?, THE BALANCE, https://bit.ly/2yKulsd
[https://perma.cc/3PZY-P2JH] (updated Sept. 04, 2019).
289. Anecdotally, a colleague who has recently been involved in seeking to
establish a guardianship for a relative with dementia estimates that the initial cost
will be approximately $15,000.  This does not factor in the ongoing management
costs and fees that may be incurred.
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filing fees, expert witness fees, and attorney fees.  There may be a
class of persons who could afford to challenge a contract but who
could not afford to pursue a guardianship.  People may not have the
resources to seek a guardianship or litigate the avoidance of a con-
tract based on mental incapacity.  If the latter is true, then the pro-
posed rule does not negatively affect them.
My proposed restriction also has the potential to limit judicial
discretion.  Courts currently apply the mental incapacity doctrine
inconsistently and manipulate the requirements of the doctrine to
arrive at decisions they deem are fair.290  Even the requirements of
notice and restitution are not applied consistently; courts tend to
treat them as factors rather than as requirements.291  Under my
proposed rule, claimants with questionable capacity could not in-
voke the doctrine of mental incapacity unless they were adjudicated
mentally incompetent.  This could bind a person to a contract that,
under the circumstances, is economically harmful to the interests of
the person with a mental disability or someone with an interest in
the assets of that person.  Some would support this restriction on
judicial discretion; anti-sanists, for instance, might applaud limiting
the judicial ability to impose rationality as a standard for measuring
the validity of a contract entered into by a person with a mental
disability.292  Others would rue the limitation based on the compel-
ling argument that the courts should do justice, not simply apply
rules blindly and strictly.  The next section suggests a response to
the concern that limiting the mental incapacity doctrine would in-
crease vulnerability.
290. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency, supra note 200, at 306–11;
Meiklejohn, supra note 93, at 353; Virtue, supra note 202, at 140.  For articles dis-
cussing the concern about judicial discretion and mental incapacity more broadly,
see Knauer, supra note 287, at 341–47; Susan Stefan, Silencing the Different Voice:
Competence, Feminist Theory and Law, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 763 (1993).
291. Virtue, supra note 202, at 140.
292. Michael Perlin, a leading proponent of anti-sanism, has written exten-
sively about the judicial bias towards sanism. See Michael Perlin, “Half-Wracked
Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disabil-
ity Law Developed as it Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 14–15 (1999)
(“Judges are not immune from sanism. . . . Their language demonstrates bias
against mentally disabled individuals and contempt for mental health profes-
sions.”). See generally, Michael Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The
Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625 (1993); Michael Perlin, On “San-
ism,” 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 373 (1992); Michael Perlin, “Morality and Pretextuality,
Psychiatry and Law: Of “Ordinary Common Sense,” Heuristic Reasoning, and
Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131 (1991).
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IV. ALTERNATIVES TO MENTAL INCAPACITY
This essay does not propose the complete elimination of the
doctrine of mental incapacity.  There may be some instances in
which public policy requires relieving a person with a mental disa-
bility from her obligation to perform a contract.  This section briefly
considers whether other contract doctrines used to police the be-
havior of the parties would be sufficient substitutes for mental inca-
pacity.  It specifically considers whether the doctrines of undue
influence and unconscionability would be adequate substitutes for
the mental incapacity doctrine in circumstances where there has
been some form of injustice or abuse on the part of the competent
party.293  Complainants often plead these doctrines in conjunction
with mental incapacity to avoid a contract.294  For those not adjudi-
cated incompetent, these doctrines are more appealing than the
mental incapacity doctrine because they avoid the stereotyping and
stigma associated with mental disability.
A. Undue Influence
The doctrine of undue influence may be invoked by a com-
plainant when one party has taken undue advantage of another
who, for any number of reasons, is in a weakened state.  Successful
invocation of the doctrine allows the weakened party to avoid the
contract, although the law requires this party to pay restitution.295
Generally, a claimant must prove two elements to establish undue
influence:  first, the party seeking to avoid and rescind the contract
must show they were unduly susceptible when the contract was
formed; and second, the avoiding, weakened party must show that
293. This review is intentionally cursory; the goal is to introduce the idea that
other contract doctrines could be used as substitutes for the mental incapacity doc-
trine.  To read more extensively on this topic, see generally Milton Green, Fraud,
Undue Influence and Mental Incompetency, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 176 (1943);
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, PAMELA R. CHAMPINE, HENRY A. DLUGACZ, MARY A.
CONNELL, COMPETENCE IN THE LAW: FROM LEGAL THEORY TO CLINICAL APPLI-
CATION 213–19 (2008).
294. See State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Tidmore, No.: 7:14-cv-00657-SGC, 2016
WL 5390630, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 2016); Jackson v. Schrader 676 N.W.2d 599,
602 (Iowa 2003); Farnum v. Silvano, 540 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989);
Schanck v. Hooper, 160 N.Y.S. 627, 630 (N.Y. App. Div.1916); In re Estate of
Gebauer, 361 N.Y.S.2d 539, 543–44 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1974); Estate of Wenzel-Mosset
by Gaukler v. Nickels, 575 N.W.2d 425, 428 (N.D. 1998); Dubree v. Blackwell, 67
S.W.3d 286, 288 (Tex. App. 2001); Green, supra note 293, at 190; Meiklejohn, supra
note 93, at 267.
295. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 15
(AM. LAW INST. 2011).
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the other party exerted undue pressure in soliciting her assent to
the terms of the contract.296
The oft-cited case Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District297 is
instructive on both elements of undue influence.  As to the first ele-
ment, the Odorizzi court indicated undue influence, or susceptibil-
ity, can range from total incapacity to weakness of mind caused by
emotional anguish, infirmity or old age, or any combination of these
factors.  It need not be permanent; one need only to have been in a
weakened mental state when the parties entered into the con-
tract.298  In challenging the validity of his resignation letter, the
plaintiff in Odorizzi established that he was mentally and emotion-
ally vulnerable and thus in a weakened state because he signed the
letter immediately upon his release from police custody.  He was
arrested, charged with a crime, held at the police station and ques-
tioned for 40 hours, and had just returned home when school board
officials arrived to demand his resignation.299  The court found that
he did not have the capacity necessary to freely enter into a
contract.300
Applying the first factor of undue susceptibility to people with
mental disabilities will yield very individualized results, as the de-
gree to which a person will be rendered “weak of mind and will”
depends on the nature of their disability.301  If the claimant pleads
both mental incapacity and undue influence, they will submit a
common set of facts.302  Under this circumstance, the undue influ-
ence doctrine may be subject to the same risk of stereotype rein-
forcement as the mental incapacity doctrine.  Because the claimant
is trying to persuade the fact finder that they are a person with a
mental disability, the facts offered to support the claim may be ex-
aggerated, leading to the “parade of horribles” often complained of
by disability rights advocates.
296. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(requiring that the susceptible party be dominated by the other, or to have such a
relationship that the weaker is justified in believing that the other party will not
take advantage of her).
297. Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 540 (Cal. Ct. App.
1966).
298. Id.
299. Id. at 537.
300. Id. at 543.
301. See Weihofen, supra note 44, at 225; Beane v. Stroope, 141 S.W.2d 537,
538 (Ark. 1940); Fewkes v. Borah, 35 N.E.2d 69, 72 (Ill. 1941) (illustrating that
courts will use a combination of personal factors to determine the mental condi-
tion of a litigant).
302. See Waterman v. Whitney, 11 N.Y. 157, 165 (1854); Green, supra note
293, at 191.
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Only pleading undue influence would arguably yield benefits
for people with mental disabilities.  The level of mental impairment
required to show undue susceptibility is lower than it is for mental
incapacity.  For example, medical expertise is not necessary to sup-
port the claim.  This lower burden of proof makes it easier for peo-
ple with mental disabilities to use this doctrine.  Because the
impairment need not be as significant as under mental incapacity,
undue influence need not call on stereotypic portrayals of mental
disability.  The claimant can avoid being portrayed as unkempt, ir-
rational, or delusional.  The plaintiff in Odorizzi did not have to
demonstrate his weakened state by describing whether he had re-
cently showered, was hearing voices, or had recently donated
money to the Black Panthers.303  He was able to describe the cir-
cumstances that caused him emotional anguish, but he was not re-
quired to show how that anguish manifested itself.
Additionally, the mental weakness of the claimant is but one
factor the fact finder may use to determine undue susceptibility.304
Other factors may include the physical condition of the claimant,
her age, her emotional state, and the circumstances that may have
led to the emotional her vulnerability.  For instance, in Eldridge v.
May,305 a spouse challenged her husband’s contractual grant of a
significant portion of the couple’s assets to the husband’s sister.
She based part of her challenge on undue influence.  The case de-
scribed the vulnerable spouse as “73 years of age, broken in health,
and somewhat enfeebled in mind.  He had valvular disease of the
heart and kidney trouble.  Dropsy had set in . . . he had become
childish and fretty and there was a degeneration of his mental facul-
ties.”306  The court went on to describe the circumstances under
which the documents were signed, including how the sister deliber-
ately separated her brother from his wife to facilitate the execution
of the documents, her brother’s lack of access to counsel, and the
sister’s complete manipulation of her brother to ensure he was iso-
lated and under her control.307  The consideration of many factors
303. Allore v. Jewell, 94 U.S. 506, 508 (1876) (describing deceased as un-
cleanly); Flagstaff Realty v. Ned, 544 A.2d 385, 386 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1897) (describing defendant as having hallucinations); Fingerhut v. Kralyn Enters.,
Inc., 337 N.Y.S.2d 394, 403 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) (describing plaintiff’s strange be-
havior and donation to Black Panthers).
304. See In re Jackson v. Schrader, 676 N.W. 2d 599, 604 (Iowa 2003); In re
Estate of Baessler, 561 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997); Estate of Welch, 534
N.W. 2d 109, 112 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995); DesMarais v. Desjardins, 664 A.2d 840,
843 (Me. 1995); Russo v. Miller, 559 A.2d 354, 357 (Me. 1989).
305. Elridge v. May, 150 A. 378, 378 (Me. 1930).
306. Id. at 380.
307. See id. at 380–82.
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led to a more holistic assessment of the vulnerability of the claimant
rather than just focusing on his mental state.  This disincentivizes
the exaggeration of the claimant’s mental weakness.
The second prong required to establish a claim of undue influ-
ence is over persuasion or undue pressure.  As to the second ele-
ment, the court in Odorizzi identified the following factors to help
determine when a party has applied undue pressure:
Over persuasion is generally accompanied by certain characteris-
tics which tend to create a pattern.  The pattern usually involves
several of the following elements:  (1) discussion of the transac-
tion at an unusual or inappropriate time, (2) consummation of
the transaction in an unusual place, (3) insistent demand that the
business be finished at once, (4) extreme emphasis on untoward
consequences of delay, (5) the use of multiple persuaders by the
dominant side against a single servient party, (6) absence of
third-party advisers to the servient party, (7) statements that
there is no time to consult financial advisers or attorneys.  If a
number of these elements are simultaneously present, the per-
suasion may be characterized as excessive.308
A person with a mental disability can certainly use undue pres-
sure to police agreements in which the competent party has over-
reached in some manner.  The Odorizzi factors, as well as the need
to establish the competent party was in a position of dominance vis-
a-vis the claimant,309 narrow the doctrine of undue influence for
claimants with mental disabilities.  The factors are not binding, but
they do appear frequently in cases involving undue influence.  Thus,
unlike mental incapacity, it is not sufficient to establish questiona-
ble mental capacity.  The claimant must go further and persuade
the fact finder that the other party actively took advantage of her
and was in a position of dominance.  The claimant must show facts
other than mental state to justify contract avoidance.  Arguably, the
claimant’s burden is heavier, and it may make contract avoidance
less likely.
For instance, it is unlikely the plaintiff in Renchard could have
relied successfully on the undue influence doctrine to avoid his con-
tract with defendants.  Nothing in the facts indicated he was in a
weakened state when he entered into the various contracts at issue.
Additionally, no facts indicated the defendant used undue pressure
308. See Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 540 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1966).
309. Professor Eisenberg argues persuasively that unfair persuasion should be
a defense to contract enforcement regardless of the relationship of the parties.  See
Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 773–78.
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to persuade the plaintiff to enter into those contracts.  The result in
the case would have been different if the plaintiff relied on the doc-
trine of undue influence, and absent the mental incapacity doctrine,
there was no basis for avoiding the contract.
Such a result may be acceptable.  If a claimant pleads undue
influence and mental incapacity is no longer available, the rein-
forcement of stereotypes about mental disability can be avoided.
Defining mental disability is challenging; it is fluid, nuanced, and
complex. It is an assessment that court’s may not be competent to
make which makes limiting the scope of doctrine of mental incapac-
ity attractive.310  Additionally, undue influence is not as stigma-
tizing as mental incapacity.  Anyone, not just people with mental
disabilities, can have a moment of weakness in certain circum-
stances.  Further, undue influence is unlikely to deter vendors from
entering into contracts with people with mental disabilities out of
fear of liability.  First, it is likely vendors are well aware of the vul-
nerability and weakness of the other party.311  Second, the second
prong of the doctrine focuses on the actions of vendors, over which
they have complete control.  Thus, any liability incurred results
from actions vendors took, rather than the questionable capacity of
the other contracting party.
That the undue influence doctrine places a heavier burden on
the person with a mental disability may make it more appealing to
disability rights activists.  It shrinks the blanket of protection pro-
vided by the mental incapacity doctrine and thus may lead to more
accountability for people with mental disabilities.  This seems con-
sistent with the dignity of risk principle and the goals of the ADA.
Further, undue influence is consistent with the goals of the DRM
and the ADA because it seeks to prevent one person from taking
unethical advantage of another, regardless of whether either party
has a disability.312  Anyone, disabled or not, may be subject to the
unethical conduct of someone with whom they are in a quasi-fiduci-
ary relationship.  Thus, the doctrine offers protection for everyone,
not just people with mental disabilities.
310. See, e.g., NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 18, at 73.  The
evolving definition of disability as a social construct rather than exclusively a medi-
cal condition is beyond the scope of this essay.  However, the social model of disa-
bility and its rejection of the medical model are serious challenges to the mental
incapacity doctrine, which adopts solely a medical model of disability.
311. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.
L. & ECON. 293, 303 (1975).
312. Green, supra note 293, at 182.
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B. Unconscionability
A second contract doctrine that may provide a substitute for
mental incapacity is the doctrine of unconscionability.313  A claim-
ant may use unconscionability to invalidate a clause or an entire
contract.  Generally, a claimant seeking to avoid enforcement of an
unconscionable term or contract must establish two elements:  1)
the provision or clause is substantively unconscionable; and 2) the
contract or provision is procedurally unconscionable.314  Most juris-
dictions require some quantum of each, although they need not be
evenly divided.315  Substantive unconscionability is an amorphous
concept.  It generally asks whether a term or the contract itself is
somehow oppressive or unduly harsh.  Procedural unconscionability
goes to the manner in which the parties entered into the contract.
Substantive unconscionability goes to the very heart of the
transaction.  It questions the content of the contract rather than the
process by which the parties entered into it.  It invites an assess-
ment of the term or the entire contract based on social and eco-
nomic mores.  Substantively unconscionable terms are those that
are so one-sided they are oppressive or create unfair surprise on the
part of the claimant.316  Courts, in many cases involving mental in-
capacity, implicitly or explicitly measure the substance of the trans-
action against concepts of what is commercially fair and reasonable,
which is what substantive unconscionability expressly allows a court
to do.
A person with disabilities can use facts to establish procedural
unconscionability.  Procedural unconscionability refers to some de-
fect in the process of contracting.  Factors the courts use to assess
313. The doctrine of unconscionability is codified in Section 2-302 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code and in Section 208 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS.
314. Arthur Leff, Unconscionability and The Code—The Emperor’s New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967) (distinguishing between “bargaining
naughtiness” i.e., procedural unconscionability, and overly harsh terms, i.e., sub-
stantive unconscionability); see also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Telecom Intern. Am., Ltd. v. AT&T Corp., 280 F.3d
175, 194 (2d Cir. 2001); A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 121
(Ct. App. 1982).
315. See Harrington v. Atl. Sounding Co., Inc., 602 F.3d 113, 129 (2d Cir.
2010); Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 350 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007); Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 729 S.E.2d 217, 227 (W. Va. 2012). But
see Hatkoff v. Portland Adventist Med. Ctr., 287 P.3d 1113, 1118 (Or. 2012) (re-
quiring only substantive unconscionability); WILLISTON, supra note 43, § 18:10;
MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 19:41.
316. Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Serv., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58 (Ariz. 1995) (citing to
Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah
1985)).
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procedural unconscionability include whether the contract was of-
fered on a take it or leave it basis without the ability to negotiate
the terms,317 whether it was written in legalese,318 whether a provi-
sion was hidden or inconspicuous due to its location or lack of
heading or other formatting failures,319 or whether there was une-
qual bargaining power between the parties.320
As with undue influence, it is unlikely that unconscionability
would have saved the plaintiff from his contract obligations in
Renchard, although there are some facts that may have allowed
plaintiff to plead it.  The facts do not support a claim of substantive
unconscionability.  The plaintiff did not challenge the terms of the
contracts as being unduly oppressive or commercially unreasonable.
Plaintiff might have had a colorable claim of procedural unconscio-
nability, however.  In his complaint he alleged he was unable to un-
derstand sophisticated language.321 If the contract terms concerning
the defendant’s right to seize and sell the yacht were hidden or writ-
ten in legalese or the plaintiff was unable to have an advisor review
the documents, then Mr. Renchard could claim procedural uncon-
scionability.  However, had the facts supported such a claim, it is
likely Mr. Renchard would have included it in his initial pleadings.
As with undue influence, the outcome of the case would have been
different without the mental incapacity doctrine, resulting in the en-
forcement of the contracts against the plaintiff in Renchard.
Both unconscionability and mental incapacity frequently arise
in the consumer context.322  Plaintiffs have challenged loans, mort-
gages, and other financial transactions under the doctrine of uncon-
scionability and not the mental incapacity doctrine.323  On its face,
317. See Williams v. Walker-Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449–50; DJ Cole-
man, Inc. v. Nufarm Ams., Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1073 (S.D.N.D. 2010); Am.
Home Improvement Co. v. Maclver, 201 A.2d 886 (N.H. 1964); Frostifresh Corp. v.
Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S. 2d 757, 759 (N.Y. 1966), rev’d on other grounds, 281 N.Y.S.
2d 964, 965 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967).
318. See Walker-Furniture Co., 350 F.2d at 449; John Deere Leasing Co. v.
Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1573 (D. Kan. 1986).
319. See Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-05682-LHK, 2014 WL
2903752, at *14 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014), aff’d, 840 F.3d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 2016);
Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. at 1572–73.
320. See Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. at 1573; A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp.,
186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Allen v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 171
N.W.2d 689, 692 (Mich. Ct. App.1969); Frostifresh Corp., 274 N.Y.S. 2d at 759.
321. See Renchard v. Prince William Marine Sales, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6
(D.D.C. 2014).
322. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 102; HUNTER, supra note 45,
§ 19:43.
323. See generally In re Tillette, 557 B.R. 902 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va. 2016); Webb
v. First Tenn. Brokerage, Inc., No. E2012-00934-COA-R3CV, 2013 WL 3941782, *1
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unconscionability requires an objective, rather than subjective,
analysis.  Neither element of unconscionability involves an inquiry
into the mental state of the claimant.  Thus, the doctrine avoids one
of the challenges presented by both mental incapacity and undue
influence.  As with undue influence, the appeal of unconscionability
is its universality; it does not single out people with mental disabili-
ties.  In establishing unconscionability, a claimant may raise her
lack of education, financial sophistication,324 or command of the
English language.325  Anyone may suffer from what Professor Ei-
senberg calls “transactional incapacity,”326 which leads to a claim
for relief based on unconscionability.
The appeal of these doctrines is that they do not discriminate
between people with mental disabilities and those without mental
disabilities.  Anyone can be in an unduly susceptible state.  The im-
paired and unimpaired alike can be victims of substantive and pro-
cedural unconscionability.  Employing these doctrines instead of
the mental incapacity doctrine enhances the public policy goals of
the ADA and the DRM.  These doctrines avoid reinforcing stereo-
types, honor the dignity of risk principle, and evade the potential
conflict between the ADA and the mental incapacity doctrine.  Al-
though these doctrines may serve as substitutes for the mental inca-
pacity doctrine, they require strong evidence of wrongdoing on the
part of the party contracting with the party with a mental disabil-
ity.327  They are exceptional doctrines and, absent wrongdoing, may
leave a person with a mental disability liable for an injudicious
contract.328
CODA
In crafting this essay, my intent is not to offer a definitive solu-
tion to a definitive problem.  Rather, this essay is an invitation to
converse about how contract law should consider the voices of
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (challenging opening of brokerage account on the basis of
unconscionability).
324. See Webb, 2013 WL 3941782 at *11; A&M Produce Co., 135 Cal. App. 3d
at 118–19.
325. See Perez v. DirecTV Group Holdings, LLC, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1328,
1333–34 (C.D. Cal. 2017); Hialeah Automotive v. LLC. Basulto, 22 So. 3d 586 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.  2009), review granted, 116 So. 3d 1259 (Fla. 2013), and decision
quashed, 141 So. 3d 1145 (Fla. 2014); Frostifresh Corp., 274 N.Y.S. 2d 757, judg-
ment rev’d on other grounds, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 964 (N.Y. App. Term 1967).
326. Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 763–73.
327. See Wendy Chung Rossiter, No Protection for the Elderly: The Inade-
quacy of the Capacity Doctrine in Avoiding Unfair Contracts Involving Seniors, 78
OR. L. REV. 807, 810 (1999).
328. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-2\DIK201.txt unknown Seq: 66 11-FEB-20 9:52
318 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:253
those historically unheard:  individuals with mental disabilities.
Common law evolves slowly.  My intention is to nudge the law for-
ward by encouraging activists, scholars, educators, and jurists to re-
consider the appropriateness of an old doctrine in light of changed
social, political, and economic circumstances.  The mental incapac-
ity doctrine imagines what people with disabilities may want.  My
goal is to shift the focus from legal imagination to the actual de-
mands of disability rights activists and self-advocates.  Let the law
hear their demands, consider their perspectives, honor their values,
and construct a rule accordingly.
